It is the story of a success transformed into a failure, only to end up becoming a success again for the carriers capable of making it profitable. Its story began with a sketch in 1988 because, at the time, it was necessary to position oneself against a triumphant Boeing. However, it took 7 years to start the project in 1995 and another 10 years before making the first flight on April 27, 2005. The first airline delivered was Singapore Airlines, which made the first commercial flight on October 15, 2007.

The development cost was staggering: in total, including penalties for late deliveries, it amounted to $26.5 billion, while the first estimate was, so to speak, only $8 billion. These huge investments were not all supported by Airbus; engine manufacturers and major equipment suppliers also took their share. And the beautiful bird flew away. I remember very well the first time I saw it fly—it was at the Paris Air Show, and what was striking was both its enormous size and very low noise compared to other large aircraft, like the Boeing 747/400 at the time.

The first market study indicated a potential for 2,046 aircraft over 20 years, quickly reduced to 1,300. This was without taking into account the development of twin-engine aircraft capable of carrying between 200 and 400 passengers over distances of 7,000 to 15,000 km. According to experts, including Tom Enders, the former head of Airbus, this aircraft arrived on the market 10 years too late—a bit like the famous Lockheed Constellation at the end of the 1950s, which was literally killed by the arrival of long-haul jets, starting with the Boeing 707. So, sales collapsed, and only 251 A380s were built and delivered to 13 operators, the largest of which was Emirates with 123 orders—half of the fleet. The last A380 was delivered in 2021.

Then, COVID hit air transport, reducing it to almost nothing in just one month, as states closed their borders in a hellish game of dominoes. All fleets were stored in deserts, where aircraft could be best preserved, and as countries gradually reopened, airlines returned their aircraft to service with great caution. There was no question of flying the largest model because they did not have confidence in their ability to fill it. Major airlines such as Air France, Asiana, China Southern, Malaysian Airlines, or Thai International have simply taken the A380 out of their fleet and condemned themselves to never operate it again.

But the demand for transport soared again. The first signs were felt in 2022, and traffic exploded in 2023. Admittedly, it was not homogeneous, as major Asian markets only opened up late, but when they did, customers rushed back to air travel. However, one of the two major manufacturers, Boeing, found itself in a truly catastrophic situation, which prevented it from delivering aircraft urgently ordered by operators when they realized the need to deal with an unexpected surge in demand. As a result, airlines had no choice but to put their large aircraft back into service, capable of replacing two good-sized twin-engine jets, such as the Boeing 787.

Thus, gradually, 10 companies have put all or part of their A380s back into service. To their credit, Emirates, which has always believed in this aircraft, has put 95 A380s back into operation and even bought 5 of them from a Guernsey lessor for only 200 million dollars, while the list price, never applied, was 437 million dollars each. Curiously, Emirates has always considered the A380 a cash machine, while its competitors have struggled to make it profitable. Nevertheless, British Airways has restarted its 12 aircraft, Lufthansa the 8 that remain, Qantas 8 out of 10, and Singapore Airlines half of its 24 aircraft. Most recently, Etihad Airways announced the resumption of its A380 flights between Abu Dhabi and Paris.

What can we learn from all this? First of all, the demand for air transport, far from weakening, remains very dynamic. From then on, the capacity of the A380s became essential to compensate for Boeing’s delivery difficulties, which we do not know when they will end. It is possible that carriers who have removed this model from their fleet will regret it. Finally, it is clear that air transport will need a very large aircraft, on the order of 1,000 seats, to solve the impossible equation of satisfying the demand for transport while achieving the decarbonization objectives announced for 2050.

Modern air transport dates back to the end of the Second World War, it will be 80 years old next year. Since then, it has undergone a tremendous evolution, driven by the manufacture of increasingly efficient aircraft models, highly reliable air traffic control, all to keep up with a demand for transport that continues to increase as a middle class arrives on the market on the most populous continents. But, while technological progress is permanent and impressive, the airline model has remained fixed around two concepts: traditional carriers and “low-cost” airlines. However, it seems that a new model must be invented.

Incumbent operators are facing the increase in their production costs as a result of the growing demands on their staff. This is also the role of the unions, which have become very powerful, even capable of blocking a corporate strategy, as we saw a few years ago in the Air France/KLM group, where the growth of the group’s “low-cost” operator was blocked by the unions. Since then, things have fortunately been settled. We have also seen in the United States, the unions take over the management of United Airlines, one of the three American majors, with the disastrous consequences that have led the company to reorganize. Faced with rising costs, traditional airlines have had to face the arrival of “low costs”, the other new concept of air transport. This is based on simplicity and better productivity, and aims to attract new layers of customers by lowering sales prices, which has been made possible by a reduction in costs that is at least equivalent.

This is the landscape in which air transport must move. At the same time, the manufacturers have grouped together and there are only two left: Airbus in Europe and Boeing in the USA, at least for aircraft with more than 100 seats while waiting for the arrival of the Chinese. However, one of them, Boeing, is facing considerable difficulties largely due to a management that has favoured the distribution of real or supposed dividends to shareholders, to the detriment of the obligation of safety. The consequence is that instead of delivering around 100 aircraft per month, which was the goal, the American manufacturer is only releasing less than half of them. This comes at a time when, after emerging from the terrible Covid era, passengers are scrambling to travel and companies are placing orders by the hundreds. The portfolio of the two major companies is currently around 15,000 aircraft, which represents 100 months of production, i.e. more than 8 years, all while orders continue to pour in. However, operators make their medium-summer long-term operating plans according to the delivery date of the aircraft ordered and this can no longer be respected. Engine manufacturers are not keeping up, maintenance workshops are struggling and the 400 or so subcontractors needed to manufacture the aircraft are struggling to provide their services on time.

And what do passengers think? There is no doubt that they are sensitive to the communication of the companies who promise to make them travel at fares well below their cost prices. Of course, everyone knows that this promise is fallacious, it only concerns at best a very small number of seats and if not, the “low cost” seat, it is compensated by the extreme modesty of the service, which forces customers to buy, often very expensive, services that should be included in the price of the ticket. Basically, companies don’t care about the expectations of customers who are, in professional language, only “pax”, i.e. consumer units.

However, it should be acknowledged that, although widely criticized in some of their aspects, the two concepts have brought about the results we know: nearly 5 billion passengers per year and a level of safety close to perfection. However, we now have to deal with a doubling of demand in the next fifteen years, while equipment is having great difficulty keeping up, whether on the ground with airports or in flight with aircraft.

It is high time that air transport invented a new model that is both respectful of the environment and of passengers, who should really become customers with the quality of service that this requires. This would perhaps slow down the development of the sector, but is it not necessary at a time when we are having so much trouble absorbing growth? The solution is certainly not easy to find, but after all, it was not either when the “low costs” were created. So let’s trust the imagination.

The subject regularly comes up in the news as soon as a new bankruptcy is pronounced against an airline. This time, it is the case of Air Belgium, which will leave 11,000 customers without a solution unless they buy a ticket on another carrier. And even since 2023, a prosperous year if ever there was one in air transport, several dozen airlines have had to cease their activity. This sector of activity is inherently very fragile, and this weakness spares no one, including the very large carriers. It should be remembered that the three largest American and therefore global groups—Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, and American Airlines—have also gone through Chapter 11, which has allowed them to recover at the cost of colossal efforts and the dismissal of tens of thousands of employees. SAS and Avianca, to name but two, owed their salvation only to the use of this same means.

It is clear that each company must take responsibility for itself and that the sanction of failing management or even external circumstances results in its disappearance. This is the rule of the economic game, and every manager is well aware of this risk. In this unfortunate scenario, creditors have little chance of recovering their money, and shareholders lose everything. This is one of the consequences of our capitalist system, which we have not yet found how to replace.

Only air transport has an additional specificity: its relationship with its customers and distributors. It is organized on a global concept with a very powerful association of airlines, IATA, at its head, which has the right to choose its distributors: travel agents. However, in order to be accepted into this group and to have the right to sell the airlines’ tickets, travel agents must provide bank guarantees to ensure the payment of the sums they hold on behalf of the airlines to the carriers via IATA. There is no doubt that this very restrictive procedure has significantly improved the economic reliability of this network, which is nevertheless essential for air transport. It should be remembered that 70% of sales are still made through intermediaries, whether they are physical or virtual travel agents, with the massive use of the possibilities of the Internet.

However, if the funds intended for operators are well protected, the same cannot be said for the latter with regard to their commitments to their customers. The latter buy the right to use their services, but they do not benefit from any protection in the event of the failure of the company they have chosen. However, since the mid-1990s, carriers have been waging a fierce war to display the lowest fares with a simple mechanism: the earlier you buy, the more competitive the fares are. Thus, customers are required to ensure the cash flow of the airlines, without which carriers could not survive. Except that what must be called a cash advance is not protected by the carriers, who, quite rightly, demand that it be protected by their distributors. Thus, the risk of default increases with purchases made often six months before their execution.

So what happens when a company fails? It’s very simple: the customer loses everything. However, the most affected are often the most vulnerable, those who save a whole year to pay for their annual trip, often to join a family from whom they are separated most of the time. The solidarity of the IATA member companies should then be exercised. It is nothing. At best, competing carriers agree to open low-cost fare classes if they have sufficient seat availability.

How can airlines be forced to create a solidarity fund to compensate for shortcomings in their profession? IATA’s response is consistent: “We are an association and we depend on the decisions of our members, and they don’t want to hear about such a solution.” So there is only one way out: that decisions are taken at the political level, in plain English by the European Commission and the American FAA. After all, these same organizations do impose their ecological rules; why don’t they care about the protection of passengers?

A new European Commission is being set up. After the formalities of acceptance of the Commissioners by the European Parliament, it will become operational in 2025. This is a welcome subject that would be widely appreciated by customers and distributors unless the companies finally decide to create real protection for their customers in the meantime.