Very interesting to follow Southwest Airlines’ earnings. It is the benchmark airline in the world of “low cost.” It was both the first to enter this field in 1971, with a huge expansion during the liberalization of the American skies in 1978, and it is also the largest in terms of turnover: $27.5 billion, even if the European Ryanair carries more passengers.

The fundamentals of the model are based on a few intangible principles: a single type of aircraft, faster turnarounds, densified aircraft capacity, no subcontracted distribution, very low call prices, a very stripped-down product with all services paid, all served by a young, enthusiastic, and sufficiently well-paid staff.

With this model, Southwest Airlines has been at the top of American domestic carriers with remarkable results. And then time did its work. Staff aged, became less efficient, and demanded and obtained benefits that were ultimately comparable to those of traditional carriers. The results paid the price. Not that the company lost money, but profits fell and, more seriously, the stock price began to decline with great regularity, which did not suit shareholders, especially investment funds. They demanded a change in management, and the latter adopted a very different strategy.

In fact, the new managers have evolved the pure “low cost” model toward a hybrid system. To begin with, distribution was extended to travel agents via GDSs; then the company entered into interline agreements, which had never been seen before. The product has improved and costs, as a result, have also increased. In total, the results were also badly affected, with a drop of 42%. And surprisingly, the stock price has soared more than 70% from its low, and the company is valued at 46 times expected earnings. Compared to Air France/KLM’s results, this would value the group at $16.3 billion instead of the current $3.63 billion, and let’s not even talk about Emirates Airlines, whose valuation on this basis would exceed $230 billion.

In other words, the stock market, which anticipates future results, has full confidence in the change in strategy of “low cost” carriers, whose product will gradually move closer to that of traditional airlines, which have gone the opposite way. Admittedly, after reaching the bottom just before Covid, the revenues of incumbent airlines are tending to rise. This was necessary because, even if their product was degraded, operational costs continued to increase, and customers no longer hesitated to leave for competitors who clearly displayed the simplest service.

It is therefore easy to imagine that the American example will be followed, albeit with some delay, by European and then Asian carriers. We are also starting to see the European leader Ryanair no longer hesitate to cancel services as soon as their profitability is no longer assured. EasyJet is taking the same path. This is how many small European airports will lose what kept them alive, as “low cost” operators have taken advantage of tax increases, decided somewhat lightly by government authorities, as a pretext to reduce their sails.

It is necessary to emphasize once again the lack of understanding in government policies which, in order to please a certain electoral clientele who will not be grateful to them, have consisted of taxing air transport in favor of railways, even going so far as to eliminate access to planes by administrative means, as we have seen in several European countries.

Meanwhile, orders for new aircraft, admittedly less polluting and more efficient, have multiplied. More than 16,000 aircraft are expected in the coming years, not counting new orders that continue to pour in.

Where are we going to put them if governments reduce access to major airports and if regional services can no longer be profitable because they are too heavily taxed? How will air transport, with its “low cost” components, be able to continue its beneficial role for the global economy and for bringing people closer together?

The next competition will no longer be in in-flight service, or even in fares, which we can expect will gradually be displayed more rationally than in the past, but will be played out in airports. The latter have become the main obstacle to air transport, which is poorly suited to the necessary fluidity of traffic, because if “low cost” carriers abandon small airports, there is no doubt they will strengthen their offer on the major platforms.

I ask myself this question every time I see a company buying another. It may be the rule of life but, to tell the truth, I don’t always see the point of it. Recently, the Turkish company Pegasus Airlines bought the Czech national carrier Czech Airlines after having acquired the country’s “low cost” airline in the past: Smart Wings. Of course, the Turkish carrier is doing well and its government is doing everything to develop its air transport, in notable contrast with the European authorities.

This is not the only example. Not only are we seeing large companies ready to devour smaller ones, but we are also seeing that good-sized operators are looking to be bought out by larger ones. ITA has been sold to Lufthansa, SAS is in the process of being absorbed by the Air France/KLM group and TAP is making eyes at the three European majors. What are the players looking for in this desire for rapprochement even if they don’t really need it?

ITA, the Italian company born from the disappearance of Alitalia, which, for once, could not hope to survive given the way it was managed for the sole benefit of its employees and friends of the government, has demonstrated its capacity for healthy and rapid development. We do not see why the Italian state did not simply let its national carrier continue its growth, which was virtuous and profitable. There is no doubt that the Lufthansa group has made a good deal.

The Portuguese government has launched a search for buyers for its company TAP Air Portugal. After a bit of a difficult few years, the Portuguese carrier has made a spectacular turnaround and is now in good health. Its size is respectable and it sits on a southern transatlantic network that is just waiting to grow. Why then want to sell what is profitable and bears the colors of the country? Because make no mistake, the buyer, whoever he is and whatever his promises, will only act for his own benefit, even if it means limiting the development of his new subsidiary.

The trend towards rapprochement, or consolidation, which means nothing, has never shown its virtues, neither for the companies it buys nor for the buyers, except in the case of a defensive strategy as is the case for Air France/KLM. In the United States, we have witnessed the demonstration of this phenomenon. The merger of most regional airlines, some of them of good size, into three major groups, United Airlines, American Airlines and Delta Air Lines, has not proved to be a success. It should be remembered that the three groups that finally won the competition all went through Chapter 11, i.e. the bankruptcy filing.

We must also remember the disastrous strategy of Etihad Airlines, whose bulimia almost proved fatal to the company. By wanting to grow too much, we end up creating disparate and ultimately ungovernable ensembles. Of course, I can always be opposed to the undeniable success of the IAG group, but for this to happen, the major carrier, British Airways, had to agree to leave the general management to a Spaniard, and it is difficult to see a German operator doing the same with an Italian, for example. And let’s add that the IAG group has a real international connotation where each component can be found, whereas this is not the case for the Lufthansa group.

And we can also ask another question: wouldn’t the companies of the same group achieve just as good or even better results if they were independent? One thing is certain, however, that countries that sell their national carrier lose in one way or another a formidable tool for the promotion of their country. This is what some states such as Qatar, the Emirates or Turkey have understood for example. Their national carrier and even for Turkey their “low costs”, largely supported by their government, have demonstrated their capacity for development. And the more their carrier develops, the more the country’s image carries estimable values.

Of course, some states are too small and too weak economically to support a company capable of carrying their image on an international level. This is what is happening in West Africa, or in certain Asian and South American areas. But there is always the possibility of creating and developing domestic and regional air transport for the best benefit of their populations.
An airline is valuable not only for its economic contribution, but also because it is a powerful cultural vehicle.

All air transport customers are well aware that certain practices seem curious, even useless.
Interactions between the actors are parsimonious, to say the least, each of them wanting to preserve some small advantages over others and legislators sometimes meddle in what does not concern them. All these little abuses make air travel strewn with small irritations that we could do without. Each component of air transport suffers the inconveniences caused by the other players and the same ones are a source of difficulties towards their respective environments.

Airports
Crossing a major airport is perhaps the most difficult moment for a passenger. Access is often complicated, signage is sometimes incomprehensible or even completely absent and the spaces seem to be more dedicated to shops, which are largely drained by the airports, than to facilities reserved for passengers. Let’s add to this the famous PIFs (Screening Inspection Posts) set in an incomprehensible way, and often different from one terminal to another in the same airport. Should you keep your seatbelt, put down your watch, open your toiletry bag, take off your shoes? In short, all these small frustrations are a source of stress that passengers would gladly do without.

Airlines
Nor are they free from abuse. Take pricing for example. Who can explain the basis on which fares are multiplied, up to more than 100 for a long-haul flight in the same class of service on the same day? This is a first source of frustration felt as an injustice when a customer realizes that his seatmate has been more favored than him. And that’s not all, the boarding procedures are sometimes similar to the gathering of sheep before they are sheared. Customers are made to wait in the bridges, sometimes for nearly half an hour while waiting for the aircraft to be ready. Why this procedure when passengers could just as well have waited in the airport. Moreover, without knowing if the difficulty comes from the airlines or the airports, there are few terminals where the boarding queues are clearly delimited and where passengers do not mix.

Governments
Curiously, the administrative authorities have a great tendency to interfere in the functioning of air transport. Flight delays are punished outright and strongly and companies sometimes have to pay compensation much higher than the fares paid by customers. In fact, some of them can make a profit by not only traveling for free, but by making money. The practice of “overbooking” is punished as a deterrent. We even see the European administration taking a close interest in the way luggage is handled. It must be said, however, that many rules had to be enacted because the companies had not agreed to solve the well-known problems between them. IATA should have played the role of referee, which it has never done, except in terms of safety with the IOSA (IATA Operational and Safety Audit) program. And let’s not forget the repeated taxes that each state sees fit to impose on air transport because, after all, customers can afford to use this type of travel and can therefore pay well without revolting.

Customers
Let us not forget them. They are also a source of multiple abuses. The behavior of some of them can make the trip unpleasant for others. Of course, these erratic behaviours can sometimes be explained by the stress to which passengers are subjected, particularly those who are less familiar with air travel. But finally, how can we explain certain jostling during check-in or boarding, how can we justify that some customers systematically put their cabin luggage in the first racks of the plane when they have decided to pay only for seats at the back of the cabin, how can we accept that some, in order not to pay for excess baggage, arrive on the plane with multiple packages and occupy a space much greater than what is allocated to them? And then there are those who claim undue compensation for a yes or no, because you never know…

It can never be said enough, air transport is a complex activity. It puts into operation a multitude of players and each of them can seize the machine. So it would be wise for each player to look for ways to simplify and streamline a mode of transport that is still magical.

It is always interesting to attend international conferences, especially if, like the recent World Connect, they bring together participants from 92 countries, i.e. from all over the world. This avoids always revolving around the same subjects.

The first observation is that the European continent stands out from the others by its attraction to environmental issues. For several years now, this subject has been strongly permeating air transport communication. It is underlying all the press releases and no serious intervention can avoid mentioning it. This is not the case for other continents, which are happy to free themselves from this constraint. The explanation is probably due to geography. Europe is a small continent, largely equipped with efficient land transport. The railway has become a real competitor to the plane and we recognize that this mode has been widely supported by governments against the air force. We even see some countries draining carriers with taxes that will be intended to improve the economy of its main land competitor, all in the name of ecology which has become the major reference and the supreme argument for the choice of mode of transport.

This aspect of communication is little used outside Europe. It is striking to see the extent to which air transport has become a real necessity elsewhere while it is denigrated on this continent. Its main use is freedom, as the President of Georgia has put it. Without air transport, countries are landlocked and at the mercy of more or less well-intentioned neighbours. So ecology really takes a back seat to this absolute necessity. In all other countries outside Europe, air transport is a factor of safety and economic prosperity, even if it is still used by only a small part of their population.
Of course, the environmental aspect cannot be set aside in communication, but it is still necessary to see who you are addressing. Governments can at any time be drawn into the demagoguery that consists of using air transport to preserve the planet, which is very practical to avoid confronting much more polluting sectors. Food waste is said to represent 6% of pollution, and clothing 7%, but confronting practices that are widespread among the population is not very electoral. So, instead of having a defensive communication, air transport would be well advised to insist on its technical progress and its practices that constantly aim to emit less CO², if only because the less air pollution pollutes, the more profitable it is. It should be noted that despite global growth of around 5% for half a century, while global growth is almost half as low, it manages to remain below 3% of total CO² emissions.

In fact, it would be wise for the aviation group, made up of manufacturers, airports and carriers, to speak with one voice by emphasizing the considerable progress made and those on which it is working successfully. I am thinking of traffic regulation and a much better use of airspace, which will be effective in the next few years. On the other hand, it would be better not to lie by announcing carbon neutrality by 2050 when all professionals know that it is impossible, which is not a reason not to work on it.

And then one day we will have to stop communicating about rates that do not cover the costs. Even if they are very little used in practice and if they are built so that customers are led to buy additional services, they do a real damage in the communication of air transport by giving the impression that it has no or little value since you can buy a London-Seville for 29 € for example. This race to see who can announce the lowest price is stupid and it is not by filling planes beyond what is reasonable that we will ensure the sustainability of air transport. It will have to make a colossal technological leap to face the next century. It will cost fantastic amounts of money in the hundreds or even thousands of billions of dollars. And who will pay for these investments? Simply the customers for whom the rates will certainly increase.

So we might as well address the general public, explain the issues and seriously start to make them aware of the financial constraints that will have to be faced in exchange for an ever-improving aerial product.

How else can we describe the struggle between aircraft manufacturers? I’m not just talking about Airbus and Boeing, but also about engine manufacturers, equipment manufacturers and new entrants, Chinese in particular, not to mention Embraer and even ATR. The figures published by the firm ID Aero, whose analyses are authoritative, are a bit dizzying.

The stakes are high. The amounts are so large that it is difficult to imagine them. Come on, let’s get into the big numbers. It is estimated that currently 26,750 aircraft are in commercial service worldwide. Manufacturers, Boeing in particular, estimate that there will be 50,000 air transport fleets by 2044, which is in less than 20 years and this corresponds to a doubling of the number of aircraft. But that’s not all, the average size of devices is steadily increasing. It has gone from 50 seats in the 1950s to 100 seats 20 years later and to 200 seats now. And the aircraft are flying farther and farther. Let’s also keep in mind that the average price of a commercial aircraft is around 100 million dollars, all of which is very approximate because between the list price and the amount actually paid by buyers there is a huge difference, which is not only on the airframes, but also on the engines.


So in this context, the two giants are obviously Airbus and Boeing. The latter has taken a knee following purely disastrous decisions which, in recent years, have consisted of privileging the stock market price by abandoning the vocation of the company. The price to pay was colossal with 2 fatal accidents causing the death of nearly 300 passengers, not to mention a large number of other incidents that could have increased this number. It should also be noted that Boeing has just been ordered to pay $28 million to the heirs of a victim of the Ethiopian Airlines crash. We must hope for the manufacturer that this does not snowball. The new management of the American giant led by Kelly Ortberg, an engineer and not a financier, is back on the right track.


At the end of October, Airbus still had 8,698 aircraft on order and Boeing 6,534, and the amount will increase further for the two protagonists following the Dubai Air Show. At 100 million dollars per unit, the sales figures are dizzying, it’s more than 1,500 billion dollars, in other words 1 and a half times the total turnover of air transport 2025. The deal is all the more interesting between the two manufacturers as they have offers in direct competition: the B737 MAX for one and the A320 for the other in the medium-haul category and the A350 opposite the B777X for very large aircraft. The characteristics are pretty much identical, except that Airbus has a big advantage with the A350 already on the market for a long time while the B777X is not yet certified and will not be far from 15 years behind its competitor when it enters service.


And the fight doesn’t stop there. Engine manufacturers hold a large part of the forces involved. Three of them are in the running: Rolls-Royce, which specialises in very large engines, is followed by GE, which is developing an even larger machine to equip the B 777X. The fight is also severe for the smaller engines. The prices are also huge: a very large engine can cost more than $40 million. So often engine manufacturers make offers for rent. For the smallest engines that equip medium-haul aircraft, the rental rate is around €200,000 per month. France’s Safran, allied with General Electric, has become a major supplier in this category with the American Pratt & Whitney.


And then you also have to count on the major equipment manufacturers such as the French Thales or the American Rockwell Collins. For them too, the field of competition is global, each contract is very remunerative and their turnover is of the order of a large group of airlines.


For the smallest holders, the horizon has brightened. Bombardier was bought by Airbus and Embraer after going through a difficult time during Covid has developed a range of aircraft with less than 100 seats, very efficient, so that the Brazilian manufacturer has abandoned its turboprop project leaving ATR alone in this market niche.


The Chinese, with the manufacturer COMAC, are seriously starting to show their noses, even outside China, by placing their first aircraft outside their borders with Lao Airlines. Largely supported by their government, it would be surprising not to see them arrive in force on the African continent.


The market is gigantic, the operators are few, and the fight promises to be fierce.

The development of air transport is measured by its growth in the number of passengers, it will reach 5 billion in 2026 and in turnover, it will be close to 1,000 billion dollars in 2025 and will exceed it in. Let’s keep in mind the continuous increase in volume and revenue of the sector of activity even if the economic results of airlines are not always there. But, since the end of Covid, the situation has improved. In fact, growth is driven by the arrival of more efficient aircraft, which allows a drop in prices sharpened by a race for the most efficient display in the very large distributors on the Internet.

However, this observation does not take into account the major role of airports. A carrier is obviously dependent on the quality of its main platform. In a third of a century, the organization of networks has changed considerably. American Airlines launched the “hub” concept in the early 1980s and given the success of this modus operandi, all the other major operators followed the model. However, it was necessary to have the appropriate infrastructure. A “hub” requires a particular architecture and large platforms have not come up to date, I am thinking in particular of JFK in New York, whose terminals were very difficult to transform and whose rank in the ranking of airports has continued to decline.

On the other hand, it has enabled new airports, which had the necessary space and sufficient capital to create efficient infrastructures from scratch, to support their based airlines. This is what happened in the Gulf. Dubai first, then Abu Dhabi and Doha have provided their based airlines with particularly efficient terminals and these have proven to be essential for the development of their carriers, whether they are Emirates, Qatar Airways or Etihad Airways. European and American companies have also complained, including in court, about the considerable advantages enjoyed by Gulf companies. The real support came not from any financial contribution, but from the provision by their governments of an incomparable tool of exploitation.

Europeans have had a much harder time keeping up with this competition. Space is limited, administrative constraints and appeals against extensions have multiplied, and let’s face it, governments have not provided the necessary impetus. All in all, Europe is losing the eminent position that this continent had to the benefit of Asia, which is equipping itself at a forced march, and the Gulf, which maintains a significant lead in airport equipment.

Because it must be seen that, at least as far as short and medium-haul flights are concerned, customers spend more time in airports than on board aircraft. And the airport journey is not like a walk in the park. This starts with access to terminals with sometimes faulty signage and inefficient rail land links. It was not until 2025 that an airport like Orly was served by a direct metro to Paris, even though it handles more than 30 million passengers. Access to Lisbon airport is saturated and the platform has to manage to accommodate 36 million customers with a single runway and a completely outdated terminal.

In short, once in the terminal, the difficulties and opportunities for stress accumulate. Under the pretext, no doubt real, of safety, the constraints imposed on passengers have been multiplied. The PIFs (Screening Inspection Stations) are still as restrictive and inconsistent in their treatment from one terminal to another in the same airport. The departure lounges have been designed, at least in the oldest airports, for average modules of 120 passengers, whereas the average carrying capacity must now be around 180 to 200. Boarding procedures, which depend on the operators, are deteriorating when they should be improving.

And then to make money, certainly useful for their investors, airports have systematically reserved larger spaces for shops, whose fees now feed at least 50% of the budget of a modern airport, to the detriment of the space that could be allocated to passengers. I pass over a number of other obstacles, each passenger knows them perfectly. The airport then becomes an essential factor in customer choice. How many of them, at least in Europe, choose the fast train for reasons of ease of access to their seats? How are the constraints imposed on air customers justified in relation to the surface track?

The best airport in the world is in Singapore or Doha depending on the year, at least in Asia. European and American platforms are far behind in the rankings. It’s a shame.

Decidedly, you have to have a strong backbone to create an airline. The more we advance in technology, the more perfect safety becomes, the more fuel consumption decreases, the more air transport basically becomes a model for the future of the planet and the more it is attacked. And in this group, carriers, those who ultimately take all the risks, are the most impacted by the attacks on this sector of activity.

For decades, civil aviation has been the darling of governments. The latter have largely helped their national companies to develop with all kinds of protection and massive injections of money. They did it because they found it to their advantage. An important company was the image of the country and played a major role in its political influence but also in its economic development. This fruitful collaboration has led to the creation of modern air transport, which has been one of the main drivers of global growth by promoting trade.

And then, in the short time being, let’s say less than ten years, the perception of air transport by the political authorities has changed. It must be said, in their defence, that the sector has not been free of excesses, in particular because it has not managed to integrate the arrival of the “low cost” model in a quiet way. Instead of accepting it as a convenient way to develop a new customer base, traditional carriers have had no other goal than to compete with new entrants when they would have been much better off cooperating with them. This is how the disastrous price war began. The insane call rates have been copied even by traditional airlines and customers have rushed to travel for a yes or no, because that’s how freedom is exercised. This led to the development of “over-tourism”.

And from that moment on, the legitimacy of air transport was called into question. It has become the emblem of the destruction of the planet, when this is totally false. Except that we can still see the effects of a certain overconsumption. From then on, it was easy to point the finger at this growing means of transport, but whose effects could lead to regrettable disorders. The “shame of travelling” began to creep into people’s minds and governments took advantage of this to take administrative limitation measures, and to levy taxes whose destination was not devoted to research to further decarbonize air transport, but to support its competitor, the railway, which was never able to finance itself.

And now a new danger awaits this activity. This involves the use of drones to disrupt the airspace around major airports. Thus, European air transport has become a new target in the war between Russia and Ukraine. It is easy, not very defended, and a single drone can not only force the temporary closure of a major airport, but also disrupt the operation of airlines because it only takes one “hub” to be threatened to disrupt an entire operation. In addition, the media impact is immediately very important.

Basically, air transport will now become the target of all the discontented. Environmentalists have made it their main target, governments have found a mine to balance their budgets, and the military is using it to settle their differences. Instead of tackling the fundamental issues, it becomes more practical and certainly simpler to point the finger at air transport, even if, deep down, the rulers are well aware that this is not the solution. But it is a sector of activity that is both media and popular because a majority of voters are still not users of this mode of transport.

In the midst of this, some companies continue to do well, even if they are also subject to strong geopolitical constraints. Emirates, to name just one, has just achieved a historic result: $3.3 billion in profit in a single quarter. This can bring back a certain optimism in this much-maligned activity and one wonders why.

And optimism will be needed.

This has been a constant in air transport since the airlines agreed to cooperate by exchanging tickets
through the “Interline” agreements which date back to 1948 if I remember correctly. But since this
sector of activity has entered the competitive world, companies have been getting closer to each
other not only through agreements, but above all through equity investments and, even takeovers.
This is how huge groups were created, first in the United States with the emergence of 3 gigantic
groups: American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and United Airlines. Europe followed the same path and
the Lufthansa Group, IAG and Air France/KLM were created in the early 2000s. The same strategy
continues in Africa with Ethiopian Airlines taking over ailing airlines in Togo, Congo Kinshasa, and
possibly Tanzania. Asia is coming with the takeover of Asiana by Korean Air and the merger of the
Indian carriers Air India and Vistara. Everyone is getting involved and even the remaining state
companies are doing the same, ITA Airways has been taken over by the Lufthansa group, SAS is
gradually moving into the orbit of Air France/KLM and TAP Air Portugal is looking for a buyer. But is it
as profitable?

Why do profitable transporters or those in the process of being profitable rush into the arms of an
already constituted group? In other words, why did the Italian state sell ITA Airways to Lufthansa and
why does TAP Air Portugal want to find a buyer? As far as I know, both of these operators are of
reasonable size. ITA Airways operates 101 aircraft, serves 70 destinations and achieves 2.4 billion
euros in turnover and TAP Air Portugal has an extensive network of 94 stops served by a hundred
aircraft, has a turnover of more than 4 billion euros and has been making a profit for more than 2
years after a difficult restructuring. How do good-sized carriers, who are very representative of their
respective countries, have to gain from blending into a very large multinational and multicultural
whole?

Of course, some opportunities were offered towards the end of the 2010s when companies that
were a little fragile economically, sometimes victims of inefficient management, had to file for
bankruptcy. This is how the Swiss and Belgian national airlines entered the German fold. The
countries have lost a diplomatic tool and an important image vector and the strategy obeys the
imperatives of the buying country. Of course, the selling States think they will keep control of their
former national airlines by remaining shareholders, but in reality they can no longer influence the
future of the airlines.

Mergers between carriers have a first advantage: the coordination of operating programs between
partners allows serious operational and economic gains, but this only lasts for a short time. Once the
reorganization of the networks is over, the frustrations begin. The absorbed company will have to
modify its computer system to make it compatible with the buyer and this is not an easy task, it will
be forced to change its alliances to join those of the acquiring group, and it will have to submit to its
management rules. How then can we keep our own culture, the one in which it was built?

I am told that mergers are essential and that a medium-sized carrier, such as those I have just
mentioned, has no chance of existing alone. The question deserves to be examined. Commercial
agreements between carriers are not new and it is common to use the famous “code shares” to
complete a network, although I consider this practice to be at the limit of what is acceptable for
customers who, thinking they are buying one product, end up consuming another, sometimes very
different one. And then the merger leads to an increase in organizational meetings, which are not
always compatible with time savings and the proper use of management staff. Finally, it is still
possible for each carrier to distribute itself in all countries of the planet using the tools and
specialized companies at their disposal, all at variable costs.

Finally, it should be remembered that the US consolidation has not been without damage. After
absorbing all the small and medium-sized operators, the 3 giants I mentioned have all filed for
bankruptcy. The same story has happened in the past with the SR Group, which after buying
everything on the market had to be liquidated, and closer to home, Etihad Airways experienced the
same misadventure and the Emirati operator only narrowly escaped.

You don’t have to be fat to be beautiful, and freedom also comes at a price.

There is a position that all ambitious airline employees dream of, that of Executive Chairman of an
airline. And yet, on reflection, is it such an enviable profession? The constraints both internal to the
company and related to its environment, in the midst of which it must evolve, can make life
impossible. Listing them is a real headache, but we can at least sketch the most conspicuous ones.

Ecology
Taking it into account has changed the air transport environment, which until now had to evolve by
focusing on its economy and safety. This is something to occupy the mind of any leader. We must
now add this new constraint which, without us really seeing it coming, is increasingly influencing the
ecosystem in which all carriers must operate. No exploitation programme can be envisaged without
taking this into account. It even influences the composition of fleets and of course the lines to be
served. And it will only increase in the years to come.

The unions
They are very powerful in this sector of activity. Antagonizing a category of staff can completely seize
an airline. However, corporations are varied and have different expectations. Of course, the pilots’
unions are by far the most powerful, so much so that in the not-so-distant past, United Airlines pilots
took the helm of the major American operator, with a disastrous result. No airline manager will
admit to doing without sometimes endless discussions with the unions because any of them,
including the most modest jobs, I am thinking of baggage handlers among others, can put their
company at a standstill.

Manufacturers
The almost endless growth of air travel is leading to a bottleneck for manufacturers. Airbus, for
example, delivered only 73 aircraft in September, a drop in the bucket compared to the 8,000 to
9,000 aircraft ordered. At this rate, it will take nearly 10 years of production to meet the demand and
during these ten years the manufacturer will receive several thousand additional orders. And there is
no chance for airlines to compensate for the European manufacturer’s delivery delays by turning to
Boeing, which is in a very difficult situation for quite some time. It should be added that engine
manufacturers are also unable to keep up with the production rate. It must be said that new devices
are more and more efficient and that they are more and more complex to build. In short, how can
you manage a medium-term operating program when you are unable to know the delivery dates of
the aircraft? This difficulty is not the least to be solved by the bosses of the companies

Controllers
At least in Europe, they are the terror of the operators. At any time and for any reason, they can go
on strike. However, in Europe there are many control centres: more than 40 and spread over the
various states that must be crossed to get from one point to another in this continent, which is
ultimately small, at least geographically. And each country has a different management of this wage
body, which means that the risk of disruption of operations is multiplied by the political and
economic conditions of each state. The United States has had to deal with such problems, but they
were brutally solved by President Reagan in the early 1980s. The European political situation is much
more complex.

The States
Governments cannot help but stick their noses into air transport and therefore very often into the
management and direction of airlines. They impose new constraints, often administrative, at their
leisure and they use this sector of activity to bring money into the public coffers without these
contributions being used to modernize air operations. We have also seen traffic rights granted to
carriers only to sell military equipment. And I’m not talking about the companies that are often
subject to transporting politicians for free or employing pseudo leaders to house friends.


In short, running an airline is certainly prestigious, intellectually very interesting, sometimes
financially comfortable, but it is certainly not a sinecure.

There was a time, not so long ago, when Nordic airlines were the envy of other European operators.
It was the time when SAS (Scandinavian Airlines System) could be named the best airline in the world
in the mid-1980s and when Finnair was weaving its network between Europe and Asia by transiting
passengers through Helsinki. It should be remembered that these Nordic companies are among the
oldest in the world. SAS was founded in 1946, Icelandair in 1937 and even Finnair in 1923.
Despite difficult climatic conditions and very limited domestic markets, at least in terms of the
number of potential customers, these operators have managed to stand the test of time by
becoming models of regularity and customer reception. Unfortunately, times have changed a lot,
except for Finnair, which seems to be doing well.


Like all traditional operators, these airlines took the full brunt of the assault on “low-cost” carriers in
the mid-1990s, when European airspace was opened. The new entrants, with their model of minimal
services, additional revenues, modern aircraft, and staff managed without bearing the weight of
seniority, have been able to display totally unbelievable or even uncredible prices to traditional
carriers. The latter were used to selling a high price to a limited but loyal clientele a product that was
expensive to operate but which had proven its reliability. However, here we are, on their markets,
individuals often from foreign countries capable of operating on their territories by charging rates
that the traditional companies were unable to compete with because their production costs, their
mode of operation and even their culture were incompatible with the new proposals.


So, the old operators tried to resist and let’s say it they did so with quite a bit of success until the
damage caused by Covid. SAS, to name but one, found itself in a very difficult situation with the great
complexity of a capital split between 3 countries, one of which, Norway, announced its withdrawal.
And no one has come forward to join a company considered to be aging, even if this is not true. This
is what led it to fall under the Peter Pan forks of Chapter 11, which, by the way, allowed it to
restructure, but also to attract the Air France/KLM group, largely saved by public funds, to become a
conqueror again. Thus, the fierce independence of SAS was largely dented by the fact that it
belonged to the Franco-Dutch carrier.


In the middle of the Atlantic, in Iceland, the “low costs” had to bend the knee to reality. While
Icelandair continues its good way, the new entrants only make a brief visit. Recently, on September
25, the company PLAY, created in July 2019, filed for bankruptcy and stopped its activities almost
without notice. Its model was to sell transatlantic flights at discounted prices with a stop in Reykjavik.
Of course, the geography was respected because almost all flights between Europe and North
America pass over this island. Except that Icelandair uses the same model but using traditional
methods, in particular in terms of its distribution method. It may seem old-fashioned to continue to
go through GDSs and travel agents, except that to free yourself from them and penetrate the market,
you have to make considerable commercial investments just to buy positions in social networks. And
customers are starting to be wary. They no longer want to buy tickets without finding their carrier,
especially since these new companies are often undercapitalized and only have the cash flow built up
by customers who are forced to pay for their tickets very far in advance to benefit from fares that are
unable to bear the cost prices. This is how PLAY customers will always be able to frame their ticket,
which will make them a bitter memory.


The same adventure happened to the passengers of WOW, also an Icelandic company, created in
November 2011 and which was liquidated under the same conditions as PLAY on March 28, 2019. We
could also mention PRIMERA AIR, which filed for bankruptcy on October 2, 2018, or even the long-
haul part of NORWEGIAN, which was also shut down in 2020.

That’s a lot. The reputation of Nordic carriers for seriousness is very seriously dented. For a long time,
southern European airlines were singled out for their erratic management, now operators in
northern Europe are facing the same symptoms. Air transport is a particularly difficult activity and its
growth should not make us forget that to launch a new carrier, you need to have strong backs.