Can Air Transport Do Without Travel Agents?

,

In the face of the rapid evolution of technologies, the question can be asked. Indeed, the arrival of the facilities offered by Artificial Intelligence represents a real evolution in the world of air distribution. The last real innovation before AI dates back to the arrival of the Internet and before that of GDS. This takes us back in time almost 50 years.

For a very long time, the position of travel agencies remained very strong. This distribution channel accounted for 70% of ticket issuance until the early 2000s. It is still very significant, although it has evolved considerably and the marketing methods between OTAs (Online Travel Agents) and traditional distributors have little to do with each other. Nevertheless, they are both recognized intermediaries because they have an operating license and access to airline inventories. In the absence of documented global figures, distributors probably still account for more than 50% of the airline sector’s turnover.

However, relations between operators and distributors have never been simple, and they have sometimes been very conflictual, to the point that they led to the end of the commissioning of travel agencies by companies at the end of the 1990s. This break occurred when carriers were tired of paying both commissions and royalties to GDSs, which pay a significant portion of them to distributors to encourage them to multiply the transactions that are their source of income.

Curiously, these GDSs created by the large companies have become the essential tool for air transport distributors. Their remuneration mechanism, initiated by the carriers, combined with a growing increase in the demand for transport, has led them to a considerable financial valuation. And the traditional companies that own the GDS, in difficulty with the arrival of “low-cost carriers”, have sold these jewels to investment funds who have been quick to increase the price of their service, which is fully paid for by the carriers. This is what is called shooting yourself in the foot.

It was a first step in the breach between the relationships between distribution players and operators. The second was the massive arrival of the Internet. All airlines then developed their own booking sites for their consumers in the hope of avoiding paying the GDS. The latter have reacted by offering distributors ever more efficient tools without being able to curb the proportion of tickets issued by the agencies. The presence of “low-cost carriers”, fiercely hostile to the use of GDS and even ticketing, has accustomed consumers to making their own reservations on the websites of new carriers, which has led traditional companies to equip themselves in such a way as to directly attract consumers who are already familiar with making their own reservations, a way of freeing themselves from distributors.

So to go a little further, IATA has initiated a new, more efficient transactional system called NDC (New Distribution Capability) so that all companies can use this new facility, which is incompatible with GDSs that use another transactional language. But the investments to migrate their operations to this new language are very important and even if the major operators have been able to afford it, the vast majority of carriers still remain attached to their old practice. The rise of the NDC language, which makes it possible both to secure access to the inventory of companies and to incorporate reservations on many other services such as hotels, car rentals, museum entrances and so on, is still very slow. Moreover, the GDSs have also embarked on this adventure, if only to keep their relationship with travel agencies.

And what about travel agents? First of all, they are far from remaining inactive. They are grouped together in groups capable of discussing on an equal footing with even the largest carriers, because they provide their customers with a local service, a personality that airlines are unable to provide.

And then they keep all their influence for long-haul destinations on which they have a great ability to direct their customers to this or that carrier. For long journeys and exotic destinations, which make up the bulk of the development of air transport, they are still somewhat essential, if only to ensure that their customers receive a quality of assistance that is particularly popular with consumers.

It remains for the two sectors of air transport marketing to find a balance in their relationship. One will have to ensure the payment of the sums they receive and the other will have to ensure the service, all with a more balanced contractual relationship.

Does Europe Want To Kill It’s Air Transport?

,

We may ask ourselves this question given the constraints imposed by the European Union but also directly by European states on their air transport. Long gone are the days when this activity was the pride of the continent. Between the 1960s and 1980s, European companies represented the jewel of the Old Continent, which was in the process of rebuilding itself after having spent centuries in internal struggles that almost destroyed it. It was the time when the national carriers: Air France, Lufthansa, British Airways, Alitalia, SAS, KLM and so on had developed the world’s leading international network, far ahead of even the United States, which was largely concentrated on its domestic space. Times have changed. Traditional operators have not been able to manage the arrival of “low-cost” carriers, which they saw as enemies instead of considering them as fantastic market developers. Let’s face it, airlines were the first to create their own difficulties.

But as they struggled with new low-cost competitors, government authorities, instead of helping them, continued to slow down their expansion. The first difficulty came in the contest of airspace management. The latter is fragmented by its geopolitical geography, each state being the owner of its aeronautical environment. While it has been possible to create a single currency whose benefits cannot be over celebrated, it has been impossible to create and manage a common civil airspace until now. The design of air routes no longer matches aircraft capabilities, and the loss of time is estimated at 8 minutes on average per flight, which is also an aggravating factor for fuel consumption and CO₂ emissions. In addition, the entire European area is penalised every time an air traffic control strike affects any of the states. One may wonder why governments and the European Commission have not managed to address this difficulty, even if it must be admitted that it is not easy.

Ecological pressure has also taken hold of governments, and they, through a curious demagogy, have placed the burden on air transport, which is accused of all evils, even though it is one of the few activities that has become aware of the importance of achieving carbon neutrality. Instead of supporting the necessary transition, the response of the political authorities has been to force operators to reduce their offer, without having consulted consumers for their opinion. This is why some airports such as Amsterdam or London Heathrow, or even Paris Orly and others that I am forgetting, have had to reduce or cap the number of aircraft movements even though their facilities allowed them to be expanded. We have also seen states outright ban air services when rail allows them to be replaced in 2 hours and 30 minutes.

At the same time, new and important traffic rights were allocated to Gulf carriers, such as Qatar Airways. I note that the Gulf Emirates have clearly perceived the political and economic importance of supporting the development of their airlines. We cannot blame them for that, but we would have liked the European authorities to do the same instead of penalising them. I also note that the latest European regulation on air passenger rights will impose new obligations on airlines, if it is adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

It is paradoxical, to say the least, to see that everyone agrees that air transport should achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, which, by the way, is impossible without a technological leap that we do not see taking shape, and at the same time, that we are clipping the wings of this activity. The investments required to decarbonise the air industry are prodigious, probably several trillion dollars, and we will have to find the resources to finance them. Where can this money come from if not from air transport itself—in other words, from passengers who will have to accept serious increases in fares that will produce increased profits for carriers, a large part of which will have to be devoted to research to achieve environmental targets. For this to happen, European air transport will need not only the neutrality of governments but their support, not financial, but administrative.

Without strong cooperation between all the players in the aviation sector and the states that hold the regulations and air traffic control, it will not be possible to make sufficient progress. Everyone must take their responsibilities, first and foremost the European Commission.

Where Will the Diversification of Airport Services Stop?

,

There is a great constant in air transport: everyone complains. Manufacturers are unable to deliver their orders due to a lack of manpower, carriers cannot earn enough money, with a few notable exceptions, airports are constrained by their pricing agreements with airlines and customers, and finally passengers themselves are not happy with the services provided by the entire chain of operators in this sector of activity. This does not prevent air transport from continuing to grow steadily since the end of the Second World War, i.e. more than 80 years.

In the middle of this activity are the airports. It is the obligatory and almost monopolistic crossing point if you want to get to a city by plane. Their position is sufficiently protected that they can afford to set their prices without fear of competition. However, the airlines are reluctant to pay the fares requested and have managed to ensure that these fares are governed by agreements between the users, which are the carriers and the owners of the infrastructure, the companies managing the airports. However, this practice puts the latter in a state of fragility. They are obliged to finance the development of their technical and commercial facilities for long periods of time, while operators can at any time change their strategy and, for example, abandon services deemed unprofitable, which takes essential revenue away from airports.

So to overcome the uncertainties and find the resources necessary for their development, management companies have resorted to two strategic developments. Firstly, for the largest ones, to broaden their field of activity by taking control of airport platforms that are sometimes very far from their historical base, and thus create a network capable of balancing revenues in the event of difficulties at one of the airports managed. And then to diversify their service offer within their facilities. Based on the principle that a clientele with high purchasing power was forced to spend long periods of time, sometimes several hours, in their terminals, the major airports have created shopping malls that are sometimes very large and attract major commercial brands and bring in a very significant income, up to half of the revenues of the major “hubs”, while providing a fun occupation for passengers.

Of course, the airlines have complained because they believe that the customers of these new shopping centres belong to them and that they are entitled to claim a share of the profit it brings. Airports, on the other hand, are fiercely opposed to giving up anything, arguing that without this resource they would have to drastically increase their fees, which is unacceptable to the airlines, and the latter claim that they are the only players in the air transport chain to lose money. This balance in the allocation of commercial revenues is unlikely to be upset.

On the other hand, large airports have to face a new risk: the development of surface lanes. The great progress made in rail transport and ecological pressure naturally lead to a reduction in the number of vehicles using airport car parks, which are so profitable, and even to a reduction in the number of passengers, and therefore of aircraft movements for services of less than 3 hours of flight. The safety constraints imposed on air passengers and not on rail transport customers are not for nothing. So imagination starts to run, and airports start thinking about new services.

Always based on the principle that customers spend a lot of time in their facilities, that they have an above-average purchasing power and that they are not afraid to travel, the managers of these large airports are embarking on the activity of travel agencies, as has recently been announced by Aéroports de Paris. This can become dangerous for the profession of tour operators unless this service is provided by an agency that buys a concession in the airport concerned. But it is difficult to see how, given the low margins made by travel agencies and the operational risks of tour operators, it will be possible to levy fees on this activity.

Once this new service is launched, it is difficult to see where it could stop: why not banks or real estate agencies, what do I know? Imagination knows no bounds… except perhaps those of common sense.

The End of the Distinction Between Low-Cost and Legacy Airlines

,

This seems to be a fundamental trend. The models that were once so different between traditional carriers and low-cost carriers are increasingly being copied. It took almost 40 years for the two models to gradually come together, and in the future only the distinction between short-haul and long-haul flights will remain. We go back to the origins of air transport.

Long gone are the days when historical companies saw the arrival, with some condescension, not to say disdain, of new entrants who claimed to make a place for themselves in a universe that was, after all, quite closed. To do this, they had the absolute weapon: the ability to put on the market fares so low that they were impossible to achieve by traditional carriers, all with the same aircraft. The difference in product was certainly real; there were, and still are, strong constraints: increased density of cabins, the need to buy tickets well in advance, the obligation to pay, in addition to the transport itself, for almost all the often-essential extras, for example the carriage of luggage or onboard services, even the smallest ones.

The vast majority of the companies already established despised these intruders and predicted an uncertain future for them, to say the least. Except that their analysis was wrong and that, for a flight time of less than 3 hours, customers began to favour price, which was often half that of the traditional carriers. The difference was even greater for business passengers, on whom the companies made their profits. The gradual loss of this prestigious clientele, who refused to pay up to three or four times the price on the same destinations, made even the largest companies think seriously. They gradually adopted the same practices as low-cost airlines, even if these practices did not cover their costs. They then tried to group together in essentially cosmetic alliances, without necessarily having great success.

The losses accumulated in competing with low-cost airlines led many air transport giants to file for bankruptcy. It should be remembered that the three largest American carriers – United Airlines, Delta Air Lines and American Airlines – have all gone through the American-style bankruptcy filing called Chapter 11. To regain decent financial health, the major carriers had to make considerable savings. These were painful, and the staff of these companies paid the price: up to a 30% reduction in workforce across all continents. In fact, the strategy of traditional airlines was to lower their level of service and even their product offering in order to almost entirely copy low-cost airlines, all while displaying fares identical to those of their new competitors.

Only the low-cost airlines themselves had to face the demands of their customers, who began to balk at the sometimes abusive practices of their carriers. They started to invent new services to compete with the incumbent operators. This is how they opened their sales to travel agents, which they had stubbornly refused to do. They then moved into major airports, whereas their strategy had been to serve only secondary airports for reasons of cost and speed of turnaround, allowing them to make an additional rotation per day. Finally, they began to establish interline agreements with the major carriers, despite having previously been their fiercest enemies.

In short, gradually, each taking a step towards the other, the two models have been converging, at least for flights of less than 3 hours. But for long-haul flights, the situation is different. Since the end of the Covid-19 pandemic, airlines have noticed that customers are accepting fares much higher than those they were used to charging, provided they find a product superior to what had become the norm. As a result, airlines embarked on a strategy of improving their services, particularly on long-haul routes, helped by manufacturers who brought to market much more efficient aircraft capable of operating non-stop flights of unprecedented duration. They created an intermediate class, often called Premium Economy, intended to accommodate customers tired of the increasingly basic service in Economy Class.

And whether they like it or not, low-cost carriers wishing to enter the long-haul market will be forced to provide a product that is compatible with their passengers’ expectations.

Thus, we can predict that in the near future, the distinction will no longer be made between low-cost carriers and traditional airlines, but simply between short-haul and long-haul flights, each trying to differentiate itself in order to attract customers.

Air Travel and Its Sources of Stress

,

It is well known that half of the passengers are afraid aboard a plane. It is often only a diffuse anxiety, but it can sometimes take on more spectacular aspects, such as the United Airlines passenger who tried to open the door of the aircraft on a flight from Newark to Guatemala City at an altitude of 11,000 meters. It must be said that a customer’s journey to arrive safely is strewn with an impressive number of obstacles.

Before arriving at the airport

The stress starts as soon as you book. Unless they go through a travel agency that will make their job much easier for a modest price, the customer will have to use their computer or smartphone to select the flight(s) that suit them without knowing the final price of the transaction. Admittedly, the carriers’ websites are generally rather well done, especially if you speak English, and it is relatively easy to choose your flights, except that the fare indicated does not include the basic options.

Depending on the needs, you have to add the price of a carry-on bag or a checked bag, the choice of your seat unless you find yourself in the middle seat, stuck between two other passengers whose size and behavior you don’t know, all at the back of the aircraft, take out insurance or not, and so on. In short, unless the customer is very used to their airline and their route, they still have to wait for their boarding pass without knowing when they will be able to get it, each carrier having its own practices.

However, it should be recognized that obtaining the boarding pass directly and thus avoiding the mandatory passage through the company’s counter is a clear step forward.

The passenger still has to go to the airport and there is additional stress. How long will it take them, especially if they go there by car and moreover if they use their personal vehicle that they will have to park in one of the many car parks whose accesses are not always well indicated? How do they know the traffic situation? What is the check-in time limit if they have a piece of luggage to put on board? How long will it take to get to the boarding gate? As the passenger doesn’t know anything about it, they will take all their precautions, finally arriving at the airport much too early, and they will not always know how to kill time before departure.

Crossing the airport

This is the most delicate and stressful moment, especially when it comes to very large platforms that are very congested, sometimes with faulty signage, and where the distances to be covered are long and not always assisted by conveyor belts. The customer will need a lot of patience and a great knowledge of air transport practices to complete the journey without too much stress. Because the obstacles are innumerable, so much so that one wonders if they were not created voluntarily to discourage passengers.

It starts with the queue at the check-in counter, a delicate moment especially for some destinations for which passengers take a huge package of luggage, trying to haggle over the price of excess weight or even the size of the suitcase. At some airports, all customers, even those with their boarding pass, must pass through this first obstacle. Once this has passed, you must quickly move on to the second one, which is, depending on the case, the police filter applicable or not depending on the country, the nationality of the customer and their destination and, in any case, the famous PIF (Screening Inspection Post) created in the mid-1990s after spectacular attacks and plane hijackings.

This is the place where you will have to endure the perfectly random rules of the gates that ring or not depending on the way they have been adjusted, which varies from one terminal to another and from one airport to another. Fortunately, the major platforms are starting to equip themselves with equipment that prevents you from taking off your shoes, or even taking your computer or tablet out of your suitcase. But this passage remains a mandatory moment and it seems that air transport customers are more dangerous than train customers, who are not subject to this constraint in stations.

The relief is palpable once this dreaded moment is over and the passenger can go to their departure lounge, provided that they have clearly identified it and that it is properly indicated. Their route will inevitably lead them to cross the commercial zone which is taking up more and more space, especially in the major airports. One may also wonder if all the precautions that a passenger must take are not intended only to lead them to create a long moment where they will have nothing to do but stroll in the “duty free” area to make purchases which will ultimately contribute to nearly 50% of the turnover of the major airports.

This is the first part of the journey. I don’t have enough space to get to the end of the trip, which will be the subject of the next column.

The Thorn in the Side of Air Transport

,

The aviation sector is going through repeated turbulence. Recently, on May 2 to be exact, Spirit Airlines, one of the main American low-cost airlines, filed for bankruptcy and stopped all its flights. However, it is not a small operator. It carried up to 44 million passengers in 2024, achieved a turnover of around $5 billion with a fleet of around 200 aircraft. It is difficult to understand why such a company could not resist the rise in oil prices, especially in the United States, which is much less affected than most other countries in the world. It is quite possible that its pricing practices, on the edge of legality, intended to attract a clientele fond of slashed prices, were the main cause of its bankruptcy, especially since repeated complaints had been registered with the American Civil Aviation authorities. I don’t know how many customers, probably several million, bought their tickets in advance. I wish them good luck in recovering their investment. This is another example of the search for visibility at the top of price comparison sites. Sooner or later, pricing practices that do not cover costs will have to end up being sanctioned. It should be remembered that below $40 per flight hour, airlines fall below their break-even point. And let’s keep a thought for the 17,000 employees of the company who will have to find jobs during a difficult period for air transport.

After this example, which we could easily do without, let us return to an aspect that is often ignored and which is nevertheless essential for air transport: the lack of qualified labour.

During the appalling Covid period, which saw air transport reduced to its simplest expression with thousands of aircraft stored on the ground in airports renowned for their desert position, which allowed better preservation of aircraft, manufacturers, engine manufacturers and their countless list of subcontractors massively parted ways with large numbers of employees. We can understand them, they had nothing more to do and, above all, no more prospects because it was impossible to foresee any recovery. So the first to leave were the seniors of these companies who, in many countries and in particular in Western countries, benefited from early retirements paid by governments. This took a great deal of weight off their employers, especially since they were generally the best paid.

But to everyone’s surprise, vaccines were found and put on the market with a speed that no one could have envisaged. So much so that after two years, the lockdowns imposed on the population were lifted and air transport was able to restart with surprising speed. Prices have increased by 30% but customers were so impatient to travel that they easily accepted these prices, which were largely readjusted upwards. And air transport has regained its growth rate, even if the current conflicts are dampening enthusiasm a little. Orders for new aircraft began to pour in, with each carrier wanting to position itself on the manufacturers’ waiting list.

However, the latter are unable to meet the demand. Lead times are getting longer without airlines having a clear view of the delivery rate of their orders. The matter is not so simple. To fly an aircraft, engines are essential and their construction is particularly delicate. The engine manufacturers Safran, but also Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce are unable to manufacture them fast enough for one main reason: there is no longer enough qualified labour. Much of the know-how and experience held by older employees has been lost, and despite tempting offers from manufacturers, new retirees do not seem to be in a hurry to return to work.

The consequences are serious. Currently, around 500 aircraft assembled by manufacturers are grounded because there is simply a lack of engines. This represents a shortfall of around 600,000 seats per day, with an average of 200 seats and 6 daily flights. That’s nearly 200 million seats per year. And this is not going to be solved by a wave of a magic wand. The training of highly qualified and experienced staff first requires time, provided that sufficient new employees can be recruited, trained and supervised. Meanwhile, orders continue to pour in.

In addition, air transport needs rare metals and, as their name suggests, they are difficult to obtain. The sector of activity is a victim of its own success, a bit like overtourism, and it is very difficult to curb such activity, to the great displeasure of environmentalists.

Things Are Moving in Air Transport

,

Movement is one of the defining characteristics of air transport, and that is quite normal. But since the beginning of 2026, we have been witnessing changes that are likely to have a lasting impact on this sector. Despite the current difficulties, which we hope will soon be behind us, the trend appears to be moving towards improved service quality combined with a general increase in fares.

The best example is still provided by Emirates. It has just published its results for the 2025/2026 financial year, which ended on March 31 this year. The results are impressive. Although the number of passengers declined by 1% to 53.2 million, revenue increased by 2% to $35.7 billion and, above all, net profit reached an unprecedented level of $5.4 billion. The load factor fell slightly to 78.4%, compared to 78.9% the previous year, but yield increased by 4%, representing revenue of $10.4 per passenger kilometre transported. This avalanche of figures leaves us dreaming, as it clearly demonstrates the company’s outstanding performance. Emirates also maintains a highly prosperous net cash position of $15 billion, allowing it to cover its fuel purchases over a long period and greatly mitigate the effects of oil price spikes. In total, the company generated a net profit equivalent to 15% of its turnover, representing one of the best performances ever seen in air transport.

This is the result of a strategy based entirely on service quality and reasonable pricing. It relies on the regular renewal of its fleet, which currently numbers 277 long-haul aircraft, as well as strong cooperation with dnata, its parent company, which manages among other things airport activities in Dubai.

I also note that product improvement has become a constant in today’s air transport industry. Traditional airlines that had allowed their service quality to decline in order to align fares with those of low-cost carriers are now moving in the opposite direction. It must be recognised that all major carriers have undertaken to rethink their products, from airport access to in-flight services. So much so that airlines which had abandoned the concept of first class are now in the process of reintroducing it. I also note that improving service quality in premium cabins inevitably benefits economy class as well and gives crews a greater sense of pride, encouraging them to interact even better with customers. This strongly resembles the beginning of a virtuous cycle that can only be welcomed.

Low-cost airlines have also followed this new direction. We can even see American operators such as JetBlue opening lounges in airports. These same low-cost carriers are now embracing distribution through travel agents and GDSs, something they had fiercely resisted until now. We even see an airline such as Ryanair, long known for defending the lowest possible fares through the support of local authorities, backtracking in the face of the growing need to abandon practices that once made it successful. Public subsidies will indeed be completely banned in Europe, at least.

Conversely, proponents of ultra-low fares may struggle to survive. A major operator such as Spirit Airlines was forced to shut down because the support it expected from the federal authorities, promised by Donald Trump, ultimately failed to materialise. In Europe, carriers known for very low fares such as Wizz Air or Volotea also have reason for concern, although they provide a valuable service by operating routes abandoned by traditional airlines. Without public support, it is difficult to see how they will withstand the impact of rising Jet A1 fuel prices, since they have little or no protection against fuel price increases, unlike the major carriers.

To overcome these difficulties, relations between so-called regional airlines and local authorities may need to be fundamentally rethought. Rather than granting subsidies, which are clearly unsustainable, regional authorities would be better advised to purchase air services from carriers through competitive tenders, with revenues managed by the contracting authority. However, this may require a revision of existing public regulations. Such a procedure already applies to regional rail transport, and it is difficult to see why it should not also be extended to air transport.

A prosperous air transport industry is possible provided that we avoid excesses and accept that every service has a real cost, and that selling below that cost is ultimately suicidal.

Should We Be Afraid Of War In The Gulf?

,

The impact of the Gulf conflict on aviation is not simple, and the constant reversals of the actors make it impossible to make predictions about the end of the crisis. The complexity is all the more important for air transport as this conflict comes on top of the war between Russia and Ukraine, which has entered its fifth year. We never end. It is nevertheless curious that the belligerents have so much difficulty in sitting around a table to find an agreement since, in the end, they will be forced to do so. The consequences for airlines are not trivial.

First of all, there is the recurrent problem of fuel supply. A very good article in Air Journal sheds light on the European situation. 70% of the jet fuel consumed in Europe comes from the Middle East and, in particular, from the Al Zour complex in Kuwait. It is clear that this source of supply of Jet A or Jet A1 will be significantly reduced as long as the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened to navigation, and this may take several months after the end of hostilities, which is not for tomorrow. But the Persian Gulf is not the only potential supplier. The United States has come to the rescue and, while only 3% of European supplies came from this country before the conflict, the amount is now 40%. And it is possible to find new sources. However, it is quite possible that the price will remain at a very high level while transporters had become accustomed to a reasonable rate, around $65 per barrel, while it is around $100, and this may be for a long time. So the companies will have to redo their cost price calculations and therefore their public tariffs.

And here is another parameter. If, as one might think, prices will increase by around 10% to 15% to compensate for both fuel costs and longer flight times, especially between Europe and Asia, it is possible that this will slow down travel enthusiasm and that trips scheduled for leisure will simply be postponed, as air consumers are content with ground travel. On the other hand, we have the experience of coming out of Covid. The carriers did not hesitate to increase fares by around 30%, and in the end this was rather well accepted by customers, proof, if ever there was one, that the race for the lowest fares is and remains a stupidity that air transport will have to get rid of.

But there is something more diffuse, and that is fear. It is known that 50% of passengers have a more or less diffuse fear of planes. Some even have anxiety attacks, and it is not the obstacle course they have to endure in airports that will reassure them. So if we add to this form of anxiety the fear of being attacked by a drone or a lost missile, this can greatly influence consumer behavior. This is all the more pernicious because, even if the possibilities of hitting a civilian aircraft in the event of war are extremely rare, the examples are very real, between the Malaysian Airlines aircraft shot down over Ukraine by pro-Russian partisans, the Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 hit by a Russian air defense error again, or even when an Iranian Airbus A300 was hit by an American missile strike, but that was in 1988. In short, we must not play with the nerves of the soldiers in charge of anti-aircraft defense.

However, should air transport fear for its future, even in the short term? I am not convinced of that. Even if there could be a certain restriction of flights here and there, it would be surprising if it took on large proportions. On the other hand, carriers may be tempted to group together flights that are not well filled, especially when the services are very dense, such as the transatlantic axis. And let’s keep in mind that passengers for tourist reasons don’t just travel by plane; they have also bought their stays and booked their hotels and other tourist activities a long time ago to benefit from the lowest rates. They will have a hard time cancelling their holidays. It would therefore be surprising if air transport were to sink significantly. On the other hand, it is likely that the Middle Eastern destinations that were becoming very popular, I am thinking in particular of the Emirates, will be largely abandoned as long as the conflict lasts, even if the starting prices are such that they can compensate for the fear of going to these destinations. This could benefit certain Asian, African, and Caribbean countries.

However, let us rely on the imagination of hard-hit countries to find solutions. They have shown their resilience in the past.

Stop The Drop in Air Fares

,

We had gotten too used to it. Public pressure, unbridled competition between carriers, tremendous technological advances, the arrival of “low-costs” and the all-too-famous “yield management” have led to an almost constant decline in air fares, especially from the mid-1990s. And we had gotten used to it to such an extent that it was impossible to imagine the prices that passengers paid in the 1970s, which saw the appearance of mass transport with the arrival of very large aircraft. Well, those days are over, at least for a number of years.

Of course, manufacturers will continue their efforts to provide even more efficient devices, engine manufacturers are developing even more economical and less noisy machines, but all this comes at a price. Politicians in a hurry to give ecological guarantees to their voters are continuing their pressure on airlines by forcing them to become even quieter, and above all, to land at large airports without being detected. In other words, they are willing to use air transport on the condition that it does not harm the behaviour of the populations living near airports, and that the environmental lobbies have nothing to complain about, all the while demanding ever more competitive fares and even better services.

However, geopolitics is an essential component of air transport and sometimes, as is the case now, it creates a particularly delicate environment. The first effect of the current Gulf conflict has been a massive increase in the cost of oil and gas. While the price of a barrel had been stabilised at around $70 for at least a year, it has soared sharply since the beginning of the conflict in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, to quote $112.66 at the time of writing. And airlines felt obliged to put the famous fuel surcharges back into circulation. And they didn’t go down without a fight. I have in mind the case of a long-haul company whose starting price is around €750 and which has added a fuel surcharge of €550, i.e. 73% of the promotional rate on which it relies to attract consumers. It is not the only one, and most operators do the same, even if not in the same proportions.

And I wonder why carriers, who are perfectly capable of adjusting their rates by the minute, choose the fuel surcharge method to charge for an inevitable increase in their cost price. It would be more honest, let’s say the word, to display the new price directly rather than maintaining the promotional hooks. It’s still taking consumers for fools. This practice is all the more curious because most carriers scream before they hurt. The largest of them practice “hedging”, which consists of protecting themselves from hazards by buying their fuel well in advance. Air France/KLM has covered its oil needs for the first half of 2026 at 87%, and Lufthansa is doing the same at 76%. That is to say, these companies do not feel the increase in the price of a barrel of oil while they make their passengers bear it, while camouflaging this increase in a fuel surcharge, thinking that consumers will accept this approach.

We can clearly see the strategy of operators who are afraid to display the true selling price, which would cause them to lose valuable positions in price comparison sites that essentially display call rates. However, customers will still have a little trouble admitting that, from a displayed price that could suit them, they end up having to pay an amount much higher than the advertised price.

I understand very well that airlines, whose economic balance is very fragile and whose profits are less than 10% of their turnover, unlike many other sectors of activity which gravitate above 20%, are very sensitive to anything that could cause their cost price to vary. It should be remembered that the price of fuel normally represents around 20% of turnover with oil at 70 dollars per barrel, but that it can easily exceed 30% in the event of a sudden and lasting sharp increase.

It remains to be seen whether the current conflict will last, in which case the carriers will have been right to familiarise their customers with this increase. If not, let’s hope that the operators will fight to be the first to stop these fuel surcharges while explaining that the time of continuous price reductions is over, at least for a long time.

Bad Times for Air Transport

,

It seems that the planets are no longer aligned in front of air transport. The latter had raised its head following the COVID disaster, which, it should be remembered, had brought down this entire sector of activity and from which it was not thought that it would recover for about ten years. The opposite happened. Within a year, traffic flows had been restored, and revenue had risen again, driven by a sharp increase in fares that was well accepted by passengers. And then, little by little, the situation deteriorated for multiple causes, each of which could be manageable but whose accumulation leads to a certain gloom.

The first and most important, for the moment, is the conflict in the Middle East, the negative consequences of which are immediate: an increase in the flight time between Europe and Asia and a sudden increase in the price of a barrel, which had stabilized at around $70 and which has risen to around $100 with peaks of nearly $120. This operational and financial difficulty comes on top of the consequences of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which has dragged on since February 2022 without any end in sight, despite the many announcements of negotiations that have led to nothing. The embargo decreed against Russia by the so-called Western countries has resulted in a ban on overflights of this country which, it should be remembered, is by far the largest on the planet. So carriers from countries associated with the embargo are subject to detours that cost them several hours of flights on their routes between Europe and Asia, which is not the case for, for example, Chinese airlines.

But geopolitics is not the only one to blame for the prevailing gloom. Many countries are affected by repeated strikes for a wide variety of reasons. This is the case in Germany, a country renowned for the quality of its social dialogue. Now it is plagued by repeated conflicts. They reached the heart of the aviation activity with the work stoppages of Lufthansa’s flight crews: 800 flights cancelled on 12 February, then those of the PNT (flight crew, i.e. pilots) on 12 and 13 March. And that’s not all, the strikes have also severely affected airports, including those in Frankfurt and Berlin. The situation is no better in Belgium. All departures from Brussels airport, for example, were cancelled on 12 March. So what is happening in such a prestigious sector of activity that employees are showing such dissatisfaction?

And that’s not all. The situation in the United States has become very complex for some time. It began in 2025 when the failure of Washington’s air traffic control led to the collision between a military helicopter and an American Airlines aircraft that killed 67 people. In November of the same year, following a loss of an engine, an MD 11F of the giant UPS crashed in Louisville, resulting in the death of the 3 crew members but also 10 people on the ground. And recently, on March 22, an Air Canada aircraft from the Canadian operator Jazz Aviation collided with a fire truck that was crossing the runways, following an error in air traffic control at New York’s La Guardia airport. This has a negative impact, especially since a disagreement over the funding of the Department of Homeland Security between the House of Representatives and the Senate has resulted in border control officers no longer being paid, which leads to significant disruption for international flights.

Other incidents and accidents also tarnish the beautiful image of air transport. India is particularly affected. The crash of Air India Flight 171 on June 12, which everything suggests was due to a voluntary act by the pilot, even if the final report has not yet been published, caused 260 deaths. This proves that there is still a fragility in this activity, which is so controlled and which has made so much technical progress, and that is the behaviour of the pilots. The crash of the Germanwings flight in France, the mysterious disappearance of flight MH 370 and the crash of the Air India flight demonstrate this. And we don’t yet know how to settle this delicate issue. I also note that the situation is not all rosy in India, if I am to believe the somewhat surprising resignation of the director of Indigo, Pieter Elbers, who had made it one of the most important carriers on the planet in a short time.

We could also point to the failure of the software of the Airbus 320, damaged by solar radiation. All the aircraft concerned had to be grounded as a matter of urgency. However, even if not all versions were affected, 12,257 Airbus 320 series had been delivered in September 2025. Small causes, big effects.

It is time for air travel to get rid of these negative aspects. It will need a lot of optimism to face the challenges that await it.