Back to basics

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Over the past 25 years, we have seen a huge wave of outsourcing in air transport. This allowed them to grow faster without incurring the associated fixed costs. As a result, airlines have gradually abandoned a large part of their activities such as catering, aircraft cleaning, ramp handling, check-in counters, and even airport lounges. However, they were not allowed to handle security operations, which were outsourced to airports. To mention only the carriers, we must add the massive use of computer possibilities, which has enabled them to transfer a large part of the operations to passengers. In other words, customers are now asked to do the work that has been done by the companies until now. This strategy has also been very effective because it has allowed operators to continue their growth while significantly reducing their payroll.

I am not sure that this approach, which is largely prompted by the famous “Cost Killers”, is beneficial to air transport. First of all, let’s note that customers, even if they appreciate being able to make their own reservation, issue their ticket and issue their boarding pass, are frustrated not to meet any agent of the company when they have a question to ask. They are then directed to impersonal telephone platforms, which are not able to answer passengers’ questions. It should be noted that almost all the sales and information desks of the airlines at the airport have simply disappeared. And not all air transport users are equipped with the latest technological tools: phones, computers or tablets with which carriers think they can regulate their relations with their customers.

This is how, gradually, air transport lost its magic to become nothing more than a machine for creating turnover. The dematerialization of services, as they say, is certainly not progress for this activity, which is gradually losing its prestige to the point that recruitment has become difficult, especially since the end of Covid.

Airlines are not the only ones to make massive use of subcontracting. Manufacturers have long since abandoned the manufacture of devices to become only assemblers. If we are to believe the statements of the Airbus President, no less than 400 subcontractors contribute to the manufacture of the aircraft. However, each of them can be a bottleneck. Each piece is essential in the assembly of the formidable puzzle that is aircraft construction, and it only takes one of the 400 subcontractors to fail to call into question the entire manufacturing chain. As a result, Airbus is unable to deliver the aircraft at the planned rate. We are talking about 770 aircraft against the 800 planned. Let’s keep in mind that on average an aircraft is worth $100 million.

On Boeing’s side, it’s no better. All the difficulties facing the American manufacturer come from its strategy of massive subcontracting which has escaped the control of both the manufacturer and the American authorities. The price to pay is staggering to the point of even endangering the American giant, which would have a hard time getting by without its military and space branch. So the two major manufacturers decided to take the bull by the horns by buying their major subcontractor Spirit AeroSystems. This company, created in 2004 to take over the activities of Boeing’s Wichita plant, had become an essential partner not only of the American manufacturer, which accounted for 60% of its turnover, but also of Airbus, which entrusted it with part of the fuselage of its planes. In total, Boeing will have to pay $4.7 billion and take over a debt of $3.6 billion and Airbus, which does not want to depend on its direct competitor, is also forced to put its hand in its pocket.

So gradually we see common sense regaining its place, at least among aircraft manufacturers. Let’s hope that carriers will take a step back by replacing or supplementing everything subcontracted and digitalized with a human relationship that customers, always a little stressed at each trip, need so much.

The best airlines

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Air transport has regained its previous colours, and the results for 2024 will be historic, even if the wall of 5 billion passengers and 1,000 billion in revenue will not be broken this year. It will probably be very close. And the growth continues without us knowing very well where it will stop. Gulf airlines are still in demand for more aircraft under pressure from Saudi Arabia, the newcomer to the exclusive club of very large airlines, and the return of Etihad in better shape. Asia is continuing to develop, and Africa is starting to show up in earnest. In short, everything would look good if there weren’t two huge hurdles to overcome: decarbonization and the manufacture of devices.

We can be confident about the progress made by the aviation sector on the road to decarbonization, even if the date of 2050 seems utopian for achieving carbon neutrality. Colossal investments in research will be required to achieve this, and air transport customers will have to pay well. No doubt they will do it if they have to, even if they complain.

On the other hand, the wall of aircraft deliveries is a completely different story. Let’s line up a few figures to understand the stakes; they are taken from the analyses of the IDAERO firm. Airbus estimates that in 2040 it will take nearly 47,000 aircraft to meet demand, but in 2020 there were only 22,800 in service. They have all been put back into operation, and in the deserts, there are only 3,900 aircraft left, compared to 15,200 in 2020. And orders continue to pour in. The order book is at an all-time high with more than 15,000 aircraft, but deliveries from the two main manufacturers are down compared to 2023. If between January and September Airbus had garnered 645 net orders and Boeing 272, a total of 917 in only 3 quarters, Airbus deliveries are estimated at only 770 in 2024, and Boeing’s are struggling to take off. The American manufacturer only delivered 13 aircraft at least in November, 4 times less than the previous year.

So how can we make up for the production deficit in relation to the demand for transport and the ever-increasing order book? This is where the impasse lies, especially since the engine manufacturers, and in particular those who supply the very large engines, are also struggling. However, without an engine, there is no aircraft, and without avionics, there is no aircraft either, and without a perfect production line, nothing is possible. So airlines will have to deal with a shortage of equipment for years. This is a particularly difficult equation to solve. Carriers make their operating schedule several years in advance based on their market analysis and expected deliveries based on their order book. However, since the end of the terrible Covid episode, they have been confronted with delivery delays for their production facilities. It’s like the builder of a house postponing its delivery indefinitely because he would be unable to complete it. We can see the disastrous consequences for an individual, so for large machines such as airlines, the stress is even greater. Sir Tim Clark, the CEO of Emirates, is the first to complain that he still does not have the delivery date of the Boeing 777s ordered in … 2012.

To tell the truth, we do not see how to get out of the impasse. Of course, there are still a few slightly old aircraft to be put back into service. This is particularly the case for the A380s capable of carrying more than 500 passengers, but this will be far from enough, especially since the new aircraft are much more efficient than the old ones, and the airlines have made their calculations on the basis of the economic and operational performance promised by the manufacturers.

Moreover, the shortage of pilots is also on the horizon. There are about ten pilots per aircraft. It therefore remains to find at least 400,000 new drivers by 2040, knowing that the current crews will have to be replaced when they reach the end of their careers. But how can crew training be adjusted to that of aircraft deliveries when there is no visibility as to the dates of acceptance?

However, customers do not want to know about the difficulties of the carriers; they demand that the operating programs be respected. Ultimately, the only way to resolve this impasse would be to curb demand, at least until manufacturers are able to deliver orders on schedule. There is only one way to do it: increase tariffs to reduce demand. Is it really such a bad solution?

Air transport – fare madness

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Air travel was built on two fundamental principles: first, to move passengers and cargo from one point of the world to another safely. This is what he has managed to do, because he strives for excellence. Plane crashes and even incidents are becoming increasingly rare. In 2023, scheduled airlines recorded only one fatal accident: Yeti Airlines whose pilots made gross mistakes on approach to Pokhara from Kathmandu. This is a performance that should be commended. The second principle is the universality of the principles that govern this activity. In other words, the same rules apply to each of the countries and those who do not follow them have their carriers banned from flying in the other countries. This is enough of a deterrent for governments to make every effort to follow the procedures laid down by the international authorities that govern the activity, I have named ICAO and IATA.

At the time of the construction of air transport and its real development, roughly between 1960 and 1980, airlines had no room for manoeuvre in pricing. The prices were agreed, admittedly between potentially competing carriers, but under the aegis of IATA, which enforced them under the threat of very strong economic sanctions. In 1960, the only two booking classes were “first” and “economy.” In the mid-1970s, “business” class was added before the arrival of a “first economy” in the early 2000s, all corresponding to the expansion of aircraft. The Boeing 707 had 130 seats and it has been replaced by very large jets that can carry 400 passengers.

The fare revolution really began with the “Deregulation Act” signed by President Carter in 1979, establishing on the territory of the United States the total freedom for airlines to operate any route of their choice at the fares of their choice. This facility has gradually been extended to Europe, then to Asia, and fare flexibility has become the rule, which has allowed the arrival and growth of “low-cost” carriers. This evolution has also been made possible by the enormous IT advance that has been at the origin of distribution via GDS and “Yield Management”.

But in the DNA of airline managers, safety is first and foremost, and almost all of their energy is devoted to ensuring its perfection. Moreover, with the support of their governments, the managers of carriers have not acquired a culture of competition as has been the case in other sectors of activity. However, this has come as a blow to them and the “low-cost” carriers have further destabilized their approach to customers by putting fares on the market that are impossible to compete with the structure of regular airlines. So they tried to find a solution by using what they called “Yield Management” which made it possible to display very low prices, let’s say at a level comparable to that of “low costs” while limiting their access to buyers. And tariffs have multiplied under the impetus of the brains who have flocked to the pseudo trading floors, which has robbed the directors of the companies based in the countries where they operate of the ability to negotiate with their potential customers. On the one hand, an infinite number of fares have been created, none of which are decided by the direct approach of the markets, but by computer engineers who manage lines or networks and whose mission is to maximize the revenue from each flight.

As a result, tariffs have multiplied. Thus, we could see several dozen fares on the same flight in the same class of service. And the customer doesn’t understand anything anymore, and even the airlines’ sales managers are struggling to explain the algorithms that are the basis of pricing. And we’ve complicated the price offer at leisure by cutting up the service. To display lower and lower prices, while they don’t pay the costs, we had to find additional revenue by selling the drop-off of luggage in the hold or in the cabin, access to wi-fi and many other small pieces of product on the ground or in the flight.

However, now that airlines, freed from GDS constraints by the generalization of NDC (New Distribution Capability), will be able to further refine their price range, in other words make it even more complex. This is called “Continuous Pricing” and “Dynamic Pricing”. Aren’t we losing common sense? How will customers be able to trust companies that are unable to offer stable and understandable rates?  Can we imagine restaurateurs applying the same ways?

I bet that the first company to return to a simple price range, announced several months in advance, while commissioning the distribution channel at least for the highest prices, will have a considerable competitive advantage.

Survivors

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Air travel is full of ups and downs, even though it has grown almost steadily at 5% per year since the end of the Second World War. It was built by airlines that developed an international system of cooperation between carriers and relentless search for safety, well helped by manufacturers and managing authorities of this activity.

And yet the course counted many deaths and not the least. In the United States alone, since 1960, 65 companies have entered the “Chapter 11” regime, the equivalent of European bankruptcy filing, and 32 of them have had to cease operations. And among these victims are the biggest names in air transport.

PAN AM for starters. It is thanks to this company that air transport has become an international activity and a real travel product, first recognized by customers. This carrier opened the north-south transpacific and trans-American routes before 1940. It created the operational and commercial tools, including the electronic reservation systems that were copiedby all its competitors. It operated the first Boeing 747s, opened its own terminals at many airports. In short, if air transport has reached the level of excellence that we know it, it is largely because PAN AM has cleared and organized the activity. And yet the company created in 1927 finally disappeared on December 4, 1991. It did not resist the arrival of  “low costs” on American territory and the Lockerbie attack completed it. And above all, she finally succumbed to a certain arrogance because the leaders, as well as the employees, simply believed her unwantable.

The same story happened again a few years later for its competitor TWA, which shared international long-haul routes with PAN AM. Led for years by the whimsical yet brilliant Howard Hughes, it had become the emblem of a chic and conquering America. She too was the victim of a terrible accident that blew up flight TW 800 from New York Paris on July 17, 1996. Finally the company had to resolve to merge with American Airlines in 2001 and disappear from the sky.

The same causes producing the same effects the three other American giants rescued from successive mergers and mergers: American Airlines created in 1930, Delta Airlines born in 1924 and United Airlines whose operations began in 1926, are all passed through the claudine forks of “Chapter 11”. It is to be feared that without this device finally very well thought out, they will have suffered the same fate as their unfortunate competitors.

Elsewhere, in the world, the majority of major operators have also been led to bankruptcy or stupidly to their disappearance. This is, for example, the case of Swissair created in 1931 and disappeared on March 31, 2022, Alitalia whose origin dates back to 1946 and the disappearance on October 15, 2021, Japan Airlines which operated since 1951 and whose bankruptcy was registered on January 18, 2010, or Varig, the major Brazilian carrier, died on 09 April 2001 although he existed since 1927.

We could mention many other renowned operators. Even recently SAS yet often cited as an example had to resolve to the American “Chapter 11” on July 05, 2022.  Finally, what remains of the great historical companies? Curiously, the three largest European operators have withstood the vagaries of history. Air France, admittedly very widely supported by successive French governments, finally went through extreme turbulence with, it should be remembered, two highly publicized crashes: the Concorde and the Rio-Paris. British Airways, which was thought to be moribund in the early 2000s, has achieved a spectacular recovery, at the cost of a terrible reduction in its network. Lufthansa, for its part, has not been spared by the difficulties, in particular the terrible crash of the flight of its subsidiary Germanwings in the French Alps.

The will to survive of both has led them to look the new realities in the face and first of all the “low cost” phenomenon that has really swept through Europe. In one way or another, these three major operators ended up adapting by being at the initiative of groups of companies that all kept their image and a certain autonomy unlike what happened in the USA.

We need another editorial to analyze the situation in Asia and Africa… and the recent emergence of Gulf carriers. Let us salute the successes and respect the companies that have disappeared.

The return of wide-body aircraft

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They were said to be obsolete, too expensive to operate, too CO² consuming, and too old, in short, they had all the defects. For decades, they were the only ones that could be operated on distant destinations. To cross the oceans, twin-engine aircraft needed an ETOPS rating (Extended-range Operations by Twin-Engine airplanes), i.e., the number of flight hours allowed to reach the first airport on a single engine. The first jets were authorized ETOPS 120, that is, they had to not exceed a distance of 2 hours to reach an airport. Gradually we went to ETOPS 180, or three hours for most jets, and we are now at ETOPS 370 for the A350 XWB. Even the new A321 XLR is authorized at a distance of 8700 km, so it can easily cross the Atlantic.

In other words, the field of activity reserved only for four-engine aircraft can now be occupied by much smaller aircraft. The latter is more easily filled and at a time when airlines were trying to focus on load factors at the expense of comfort and even fare, it made more sense to replace wide-body aircraft with lighter aircraft. And now Covid has arrived at the right time to ground the Boeing 747 and Airbus 380. While these devices were widely preferred by customers, they were of an old design and operators wanted to get rid of them as soon as possible. The opportunity was too good, it was seized immediately.

The world has emerged from this disastrous period and even if the conflict between Ukraine and Russia still pollutes the atmosphere, the demand for transport has suddenly resumed. Ecological injunctions have certainly been taken into account by the sector, but the results are not expected for twenty years. In the meantime, we must give satisfaction to the market. And, icing on the cake, tariffs have increased very significantly, by around 30%, which makes it much easier to reach the break-even point. Of course, the brand new large jets, the Boeing 777X and Airbus 350-1000 can carry more than 400 passengers, which brings their capacity closer to that of the latest Boeing 747-8 and Airbus A380, but customers still prefer the latter, which still carry 200 more passengers. And then manufacturers are struggling to deliver the recently ordered devices.

So we take the four-engine aircraft out of the aircraft cemeteries where they were stored. Not surprisingly, Emirates has put its A380s back into service. It was the first, I would say as usual. And it worked so well that the B777s were gradually being replaced by the flag aircraft, mainly for the higher classes, First and Business, for which the A380 had no equivalent. But the Boeing 747-8 has still not said its last word. It is also newer than its competitor Airbus. This is how the big carriers bring out the biggest devices when they thought they would never reuse them. The demand for transport is present, it is dynamic and the approximately 4 billion passengers transported in 2019 will probably be reached in 2023, but with a much higher turnover given the rise in prices. This phenomenon can be seen in all continents, following Qantas’ recent announcement of the return of its A380s, the last carrier to return to service with its B747s, is Korean Air, while Asian countries were the last to fully open their borders.

We buried the magnificent devices a little quickly. They have made air travel prosper and they have allowed new layers of less fortunate customers to still benefit from the freedom attached to this mode of transport. The very high demand will not be able to be supported solely by the multiplication of smaller aircraft, even if they make it possible to open new direct services without going through the “hubs” so complicated and so expensive to operate.

Major airports are again close to saturation. Aircraft parking lots and the number of walkways cannot be developed infinitely except to create new platforms very far from urban areas. But then it will be necessary to take into account in the calculation of CO² emissions the increasingly distant journeys to get to the terminals.

It might be wise for the two major manufacturers to get back to the dough to create new, more efficient versions of aircraft with more than 600 seats. Boeing has made 8 versions of its fabulous 747, Airbus only one of the A380 despite the enormous insistence of Tim Clark the boss of Emirates who says he is ready to be the launch carrier of the big aircraft of the future.

Air transport can say thank you to covid

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Let’s assume that we are out of the nightmare of the pandemic since China has just dropped its barriers. It is the last country after being the first to close its borders. Vaccines are effective and the vast majority of populations are now protected. And finally, air transport is not doing so badly, and we can even imagine that Covid has been beneficial to it, for several reasons.

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Photo by Maria Tyutina

First, it showed its usefulness to such an extent that the states supported it even beyond what could be hoped. Thus the US has injected more than 60 billion dollars to keep the companies alive, France has massively supported its national carrier, but also, even in a lesser way, the other companies, and the German government has gone so far as to take shares in the Lufthansa group when it was against its principles and those of the company. Italy tried desperately to save Alitalia, but that patient was terminally ill and had to resign himself to the loss of his national jewel to replace it with ITA.

All this clearly shows how air transport is considered by States to be of exceptional importance. Governments have understood that it is both an essential factor in the economy and the best ambassador of countries. At the height of the pandemic, it proved its usefulness in transporting masks and vaccines. No one doubts its usefulness anymore, here is the first result.

And then during this troubled period, officials took the opportunity to launch major reorganization maneuvers. A large number of employees have left the sector, which has made it possible to reduce the size of the workforce without having to face major social movements. Thus companies now find themselves with a reduced payroll and a better organization. The recovery has certainly forced hiring to resume, but it is necessary to get traffic through. As a result, ratios are improving and the results that are beginning to be published for 2022 reflect a better performance in the management of companies.

Meanwhile, many carriers took the opportunity to ground the oldest aircraft and replace them with the latest generation of aircraft that are more suitable and more efficient. This has several advantages. First, a serious step towards carbon neutrality, which remains the essential condition for the acceptance of air transport by new generations. The new aircraft are more comfortable, better

equipped, and the air transport product is seriously improved. Finally, the new aircraft consume less fuel, so they cost less and they are ready for the use of SAF (Sustainable Aviation Fuel). Still, many ground devices are quite suitable for use. It would be a shame to let them rot when they would be very useful in some countries that still do not have access to new aircraft.

Finally, prices have risen significantly. The mad race for volumes from ever lower tariffs has come to an abrupt end. Increases of around 30% have become commonplace. So this irritates a part of consumers who had become accustomed to traveling for ridiculous prices but which they finally thought were the norm. We are gradually returning to common sense, on the express condition that the tariff war does not resume. The danger is not removed because we are going towards a period where the supply will be plethoric between the new devices ordered and those that will leave the car parks. For the moment, demand is still dynamic and it accepts the new fee schedules. For their part, carriers have seen the value of not selling off their seats recklessly. The financial results were well affected.

What would have happened without the abrupt halt of air transport, for more than 2 years as a result of the pernicious Covid? No doubt the infernal race in which it was launched: more passengers, more aircraft, less revenue, would have continued until the moment when the populations would have demonstrated a rejection of this mode of transport under increased ecologist pressure. The equilibrium load factors would be raised above 90% leading to a deterioration in the quality of service. And the companies’ financial results would have remained just as precarious.

Covid has forced air travel to return to its fundamentals: a quality product, sold at a simply reasonable price.

And that’s fine.

How to reconcile the growth of air transport and ecological constraints

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First of all, let us welcome the agreement between Qatar Airways and Airbus in the dispute between them following the deterioration of the paint of the A350s delivered to the Gulf carrier. Without this “happy ending,” it was more than likely that the war between the two behemoths would have enriched only law firms for years. It is done and Qatar Airways will be able to complete its fleet of A350 of the 21 aircraft that the Qatari civil aviation had grounded, probably at the request of the charismatic president of the company, the 23 A350/1000 that Airbus still has to deliver, and the 50 A321 Neo that the manufacturer retained pending the solution to the conflict. In total, Qatar will be equipped with 44 wide-body and 50 medium-sized aircraft that can also provide long-haul aircraft. In other words, the equivalent of an entire fleet for an already large company.

This comes at the right time because air traffic already well-started in 2022 will still receive an additional boost with the arrival of Asian markets whose impatience of their consumers is still difficult to measure. Despite considerable pressure from environmentalists widely supported by the media, one wonders why the demand for air transport will only increase in the coming years, even with significantly higher fares than in the past.

So how to solve the “squaring of the circle”? The search by airlines for the right solution to reduce costs so as not to ask for too much internal savings finally found its solution in Covid. The dramatic period that air transport has gone through has made it possible to reshuffle the cards. Very naturally, many employees in the sector have left to move towards jobs considered more interesting and probably less restrictive. This has made it possible to reduce the volume of staff and rethink more efficient management. In addition, the need to gradually protect air transport from the permanent threats carried by the ecological wave has made it possible to reverse the price curve hitherto pulled down in a mad race for volume.

Two fundamental factors have thus changed the economic situation: fewer charges on the one hand and better unit revenue on the other, all with a number of passengers certainly still down compared to 2019, but large enough to guarantee serious profitability, as can be seen with American mega carriers. Therefore, it does not take a great cleric to predict that once the levels of 2019 are restored, traffic will start to rise again. It remains to be seen how this growth can be compatible with the objective of reducing CO² emissions.

It is likely to see an increase in long-haul flights with the new single-aisle twin-engine aircraft with 200 to 250 seats. The two major manufacturers have indeed chosen smaller and yet very efficient aircraft by abandoning the very large aircraft that have made the prosperity of the large companies, I am talking about the Boeing 747 and the Airbus 380 whose end of production was announced with a curious simultaneity, but this is probably only a coincidence.

Just to absorb the additional demand that will inevitably unfold, there will probably be a lack of a large aircraft, capable of making a jump equivalent to that experienced when long-haul aircraft went from 100 to 400 seats. Growth, even if it does not reach the 5% rates that we have experienced in the past, will apply to already considerable volumes. Based on 4 billion passengers in 2019, the application of growth 2 times lower, or 2.5%, still leads to 750 million additional passengers from the year 2030. How will we ensure that people who wish to move without sufficient capacity are satisfied?

In the absence of a real revolution in propulsion modes that cannot reasonably be envisaged before the mid-2040s, it seems logical that Boeing as well as Airbus would make a modernized and ecological version of the two giants they have just scrapped. That’s what Tim Clark, the remarkable CEO of Emirates, asks and he’s never been wrong.

Belly dance around the Italian market

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Italian air transport is still coveted, but all attempts to control it have so far failed. In fact, this mainly concerns international traffic because domestic transport has passed into the hands of “low cost” companies, first and foremost Ryanair followed by EasyJet. All this because the national company has not been able to defend its positions, eaten away by successive. plagued by successive flip-flops linked to the numerous government changes.

It is striking, however, that most Italian government officials have sought to get rid of a burden they could no longer bear without deciding to go through with their efforts. This is how, from the not-so-distant time of the late Alitalia, mergers were attempted with KLM and Air France in 2001, Aeroflot in 2007, then Air France again in 2007, then in 2011 a trial merger with Air France/KLM before letting Etihad Airways take up to 49% of the company in 2014. And I pass on other failed attempts from the beginning of the discussions, such as with Lufthansa.

All the equity investments did not save a company that was very successful during the 1970s. At the time, it was one of the major European players in international transport, operating up to 186 aircraft. So it was necessary to face the evidence under the pressure of the European authorities tired of seeing the Italian state replenish the coffers still empty by loans never repaid. And this is how ITA (Italia Trasporto Aereo Spa) was created in 2020 and took over the assets and operations of Alitalia in October 2021 by operating a fleet of sixty aircraft.

And since then, belly dancing has started again. The Italian government, which owns ITA, has made no secret of its intention to sell the company. And the candidates were not long in coming. As early as 14 January 2022, Lufthansa and the Swiss cruise line MSC made a first full takeover offer, which was refused by the Italian state, which wanted to keep an eye on its national carrier. Less than two months later, on March 10, 2022, a  consortium composed of  Air France, Delta Air Lines, and the Certares fund proposed to take a strong minority stake, only Air France was blocked by European rules that first oblige the company to repay loans granted by the state during the Covid crossing. Lufthansa then returned on August 31 with a minority proposal that was rejected by the new government. And finally, on January 19, 2023, the German carrier came back with a new, more minority proposal but with the possibility of buying the entire ITA. It would seem that the transalpine authorities are inclined to accept such an offer, especially since Lufthansa has indicated that if it is not accepted, it will focus its interest on TAP, the Portuguese carrier, or even on SAS, the Nordic company in great difficulty.

That is where we are. And I wonder why it would be so relentless to take control of ITA because it is certainly not in the interest of ITA, but only with the idea of capturing the Italian international market to transit it through foreign airports. This is also why the government is so reluctant to complete an operation from which the country will certainly not come out as a winner. Two previous attempts at reconciling with foreign carriers have failed. Air France which had taken every precaution to preserve Italian self-esteem was never able to organise Alitalia’s operations in coordination with its own. It has never been possible, for example, to unify reservation and check-in systems. Etihad Airways, for its part, has ruined itself by injecting money to make ends meet without getting anything, except at the margin, from the Italian market to Asia or Africa.

It must be recognized that the very strong Italian culture has great difficulty marrying another, even if it is close to it like the French. Let us acknowledge that Lufthansa has succeeded perfectly in taking over Swiss after the disaster of Swissair and Austrian Airlines. But these two carriers are of Germanic culture, which greatly simplifies exchanges. Relations are much more difficult with the Belgians of SN Brussels.

Basically, we still wonder why with a fleet of 60 aircraft that will quickly grow to a hundred and a very dynamic international market, ITA could not cope on its own. After all, many carriers make a profit without having the same strengths.

The Situation of Airports

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I found Willie Walsh’s latest outing about airports shocking, accusing them of indecently increasing their fares to compensate for the damage caused by COVID-19. I understand that it is not pleasant for airlines to have to pay more for the same services as before the pandemic, but the situation at airports must also be taken into account.

I note that carriers, especially the larger ones, have received massive aid from their respective governments, and this is very justified. When I talk about massive aid, a total of more than $100 billion has fallen into their coffers, which has allowed them to keep their heads above water. Not all companies have benefited from this assistance and some, the smallest, but not necessarily the most fragile, have had to fend for themselves. And to keep up, they were led to lay off massively while the big Europeans have roughly managed to get through this delicate period by keeping most of their staff.

But airports as a whole have not been treated with as much solicitude on the part of the authorities. Most did not receive any assistance. They are probably paying for the image of prosperity that was attached to them. Certainly the very large platforms have made comfortable profits over the last 10 prosperous years. And the shareholders, often the states themselves, have received serious dividends. So the recent period passed, roughly for the moment a year and a half of a farm reduced to more than 70%, has left them exhausted. They must rebuild their health. The prosperity of air transport as a whole is at stake.

I also note that they are essentially dependent on the strategies of the carriers, which can be very changeable. The example of Clermont-Ferrand airport is very illustrative in this respect. At the request of HOP, in other words air France, the airport was transformed to house an operation into a “hub”. This has led to very large investments that can only be amortized in twenty years. Except that the carrier has changed its priorities and decided to abandon the Auvergne connecting platform. And who will take into account the inevitable deficits that this measure has caused?

Environmental pressure is also a factor of uncertainty for airports. Arbitrary decisions, taken without any consultation by some governments to stop the air services that can be carried out, more or less wellmoreover,  by train in less than 2h30, but we are now talking about 4h00, or even more in some countries, lead to the ruin of these facilities often created at the request of carriers, or even governments themselves. The Union of French Airports has also launched an action with the European authorities to ensure that the sacrosanct right to move freely in Europe is respected, without imposing on customers the means of transport. One wonders, moreover, on what basis a State can free itself from European treaties such as the Open Sky established in 1988 and applied since 1992 with the so beneficial results attached to it.

I am not here to defend airports or carriers, I just want to see air transport not killed. But this is what is emerging insidiously and little by little. It therefore seems more than urgent that the actors of this formidable sector of activity stop tripping each other and that, on the contrary, they join forces to simply remind the public how essential it is not only to economic prosperity but that it is also an essential factor of peace. So, great gods, let the companies stop making war on airports, and let them consult with their users.

One thing is certain, air transport will have to cost more in the future. It will be necessary to pay for the necessary research to achieve a certain form of carbon neutrality. We are talking about several hundred billion dollars. It will not be enough to say that air transport produces only 2.5% or 3% of CO² emissions, it will be necessary to reduce them while maintaining the growth of traffic, because the populations need it.

Everyone has to get on with it. Travel agents must stop looking for the lowest prices that are far from covering cost prices, airports will be forced to improve their services and equipment, and carriers will have to stop promoting insane fares that only have the effect of attracting gogos in order to actually sell them much more expensive services than those advertised.

Internal wars must stop. The stakes are high