The powerful and constant offensive of the promoters of ecology has acted as a scarecrow on air transport, which, very unjustly attacked, has sought solutions, even if it means profoundly modifying certain aspects of this activity, such as, for example, stopping the reduction in fares. All the measures taken are not without interest because the more this sector of activity meets the criteria of good ecological conduct, the more profitable it will be. However, this requires colossal investments that will only have their full effect in the very long term, while being financed in the short term. We will not be spared from price increases to finance such complex research. But the constraints suffered by operators are only very gradually noticeable. Another factor is much more penalizing: geopolitics.

It has just been remembered since the extension of the conflict to the Middle East. Suddenly, air traffic in the region was brought to an almost complete standstill. It must be said that civilian aircraft can be prime targets when they are unable to defend themselves, and airports are important infrastructures, perfectly located, and that it only takes a single impact, even in a car park, to bring them to a standstill.

This is what happened with strikes, admittedly limited, but which hit the airports of Dubai, Doha, or Oman, to mention only the main ones. Dubai and Doha are huge hubs. They are home to the two main “hubs” in the region and among the most important in the world. So the shutdown of their exploitation has not only local and regional consequences, but also global ones. And they are difficult to replace because their efficiency is created by a conjunction between fixed equipment on the ground and two very large operators, Qatar Airways and Emirates. And these two companies operate on the entire planet.

But the consequences don’t stop there. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz immediately led to an increase in the price of oil, which has risen by 59% since December 16, when it was quoted at $58.64 per barrel, while on March 6 it rose to $93.04. This is not going to do business for air transport anywhere in the world, even if many companies have already secured their supplies, at least for the year.

And then there are the insurances. Air transport is largely covered by a battery of insurance contracts that range from the manufacture of planes to the loss of luggage. However, some events are not covered, in particular the case of weather hazards, but also armed conflicts. So customers who thought they were protected by their travel insurance are discovering that they have to fend for themselves.

And it’s not over. The rights to fly over territories depend on the will of each state, which can prohibit access at will. This is the decision of Russia, in particular, which, in response to the embargo imposed on it by the so-called Western countries, has banned all airlines from these countries from flying over it. However, Russia has the largest airspace in the world, and all flights between Europe and East Asia must fly over Siberia, and if the overflight is impossible, then it is necessary to pass through the south of the Asian continent, which extends the flight time by more than 2 hours in each direction, and each hour of flight of a long-haul aircraft such as the Boeing 777 or the Airbus A350 costs around 30,000 dollars. For a round trip, the additional cost is therefore $120,000 for Western carriers, while Chinese operators can fly freely over Russia. However, since the conflagration in the Middle East, the entire area has been declared a war zone, and it can no longer be used by carriers. You then have to go around the Arabian Peninsula to get to Asia.

It is easy to see how a conflict, even a very localized one, can have harmful consequences on the entire air transport activity. I also do not forget that the supply of spare parts and the entire widely dispersed aircraft manufacturing complex may also be affected by increases in customs duties.

Basically, we can only admire the resilience of air transport, which, even in the face of all these difficulties, nevertheless continues to grow steadily. Must the inhabitants of our planet have a furious need to travel? And that’s good.

Surprisingly, last week, the Court of Justice of the European Union, in a final ruling after 16 years of proceedings, condemned a (so-called) cartel of airlines for collusion on service prices in the air cargo sector. This concerns Air France, KLM and their subsidiary Martinair, but also British Airways and Singapore Airlines, among others. The amount of the fines is not insignificant: 183 million euros for Air France and 127 million euros for KLM, for example.

One can legitimately question the validity of these sentences. How could an agreement between airlines, sometimes competitors, affect the smooth running of this sector of activity? As far as I know, Air France, KLM, and Martinair are part of the same capital group, and it is reasonable to try to improve the profitability of the whole. Instead, they will have to pay 340 million euros. For whose benefit?

Of course, I understand that the European Commission, as well as the U.S. federal government, seek to fight against dominant positions in order to avoid monopolies that would be built to the detriment of consumers. But then why authorize the acquisition of capital shareholdings? And, speaking only of Europe, has this in any way hindered the fierce competition between the major operators on this continent?

Let’s go a little further. Air transport has been built for more than 80 years on agreements, or even collaboration, between carriers. This is evident both in the technical field, with the safety rules imposed by the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), and in commercial cooperation carried out within IATA (International Air Transport Association) which, in particular, manages the BSP (Billing and Settlement Plan), the global tool for the distribution and repatriation of passenger sales. Why accept joint ventures between competing carriers, such as Delta Air Lines and Air France/KLM or American Airlines and British Airways, on the major international route, the Transatlantic?

Moreover, the practice of codesharing, which consists of selling flights operated by another carrier under the brand name of a different airline, is commonly used without regulatory authorities seeing any disadvantage, while there could be much to complain about from the consumers’ point of view.

I also note that the decision of the European Court of Justice may have new consequences, particularly with regard to the latent conflict between Lufthansa and Deutsche Bank over the fuel surcharge cartel. The bank’s claims on behalf of some of its large clients amount to several billion euros.

I do not see how agreements between carriers would be reprehensible, provided that they do not aim to create a monopolistic situation, which is difficult to imagine on a continent where the freedom to operate is granted to any company approved by civil aviation authorities. Freedom of trade is a major factor in economic expansion, and the relentless struggle between competitors whose aim is only to lower selling prices—or at least display them—can only weaken a sector where margins are, on average, less than 7% of turnover, while capital requirements are considerable.

It is conceivable that the courts, and particularly the supreme authorities, have other concerns than controlling the way operators conduct their commercial strategies. The best protection for consumers remains free competition. All that remains is the allocation of operating capacity at the major airports. These are subject to ecological constraints, many of which are nevertheless highly demagogic.

The accounts of the major companies affected by the Court of Justice’s decision will not be impacted because the fines in question had been provisioned for a long time. Even if this does not change anything in the current economic situation, it is a bad sign for air transport—in freight for the moment, but perhaps for passengers in the future as well.

The financial results for 2025 are coming in, and they give a good idea of how the sector is evolving.

European airlines have been doing well over the past year, while the American giants are still struggling somewhat. All in all, 2025 will not have been such a bad year, helped by an average oil price that remained reasonable at around $67 per barrel. Remember that in 2010, analysts expected it to reach $200. This shows that making forecasts, especially in the long term, remains a perilous exercise.

The American giants are showing some signs of weakness. Delta Air Lines’ net profit is down 5% to $3.8 billion. United Airlines’ is reportedly up 6%. However, American Airlines saw its net profit collapse by 87% to just $111 million, on revenue of $54 billion, double that of the Air France KLM group. The latter achieved a real performance by turning all its indicators green, with a net profit of €1.754 billion compared to €489 million the previous year. Its financial indicators, from equity to cash flow, are all improving. The only downside is that its low cost subsidiary Transavia France is still unable to make a profit, and its unit costs remain high for this sector at €6.73 per seat kilometre offered, compared to revenue of €6.64. The Lufthansa Group also achieved a good result, with a 32% increase in profit to €1.93 billion. Only the IAG group saw its profit fall, by 2.3%, to €1.4 billion.

The full results for the sector are not yet known because Gulf carriers and some Asian and African airlines close their accounts on March 31. Nevertheless, the outlook appears favourable.

The fact remains that many hazards can impact air transport activity, and they rarely move in the right direction. In 2025 alone, the shutdown in the USA certainly weighed heavily on the results of the major American carriers, as it occurred during the end of year holiday period. In addition, current or planned conflicts are seriously complicating operations. This is the case for European carriers, which are seeing flight times extended by around two hours on services to Asia following the ban on flying over Siberia and due to the situation in Iran, while Asian carriers do not face the same disadvantages. Furthermore, the thunderous announcements of the American President are at the very least disrupting short and medium term operating plans.

But amid these difficulties, to which one could add the impact of ecological constraints that have heavily penalised companies such as KLM, there are also some grounds for satisfaction.

First, and hopefully soon, the reopening of connections to Venezuela, a large country and an important destination for economic, touristic and family reasons. This will give a boost to South American services, which are in real need of it.

And then the airlines have taken a historic turn. Instead of continuing, as they have done for more than 30 years, to pursue fare reductions, which were often accompanied by a decline in product quality through reduced services and excessive cabin densification, we are now witnessing an improvement in product quality. In fact, the inflection point came with Covid. As soon as this disastrous pandemic ended, operators raised their prices and realised that this did not lead to a decline in demand. They might have suspected this earlier, but better late than never. The momentum has now taken hold. European airlines in particular have all decided to enhance their products. The most spectacular example can be seen at Air France KLM, which, it must be said, had fallen very low. Its policy of upgrading its offering appears beneficial, judging by the significant improvement in its financial results. Customers are willing to pay more for a better product. This is not new, and it is encouraging that airline executives have recognised it.

If this strategy continues, and if geopolitical conditions do not deteriorate during 2026, we can expect a further improvement in results that will make air transport the leading sector in the world, for the good of all.

If there is one continent that truly needs air transport, it is Africa. The distances to be covered are long, and ground infrastructure is relatively weak and often in poor condition. An additional factor is security, as the continent is still affected by numerous internal conflicts. I would also add that Africa’s growth rate is among the highest in the world and that its very young population is eager for progress. In short, everything is coming together to give air travel a place like no other in the world.

And yet, this sector is still far from maturity. There are many reasons for this. First, there is the resistance of states to opening their airspace in order to protect their national airlines. Signed conventions have often not been respected, despite the triumphant declarations that marked the end of official meetings. Secondly, there is a flagrant lack of capital. Air transport requires significant equity investment, and states, most of which own their national carriers, are often reluctant to finance fleet renewal. We must also mention the corruption that persists in many countries, which limits the proper allocation of financial resources.

It must be acknowledged that until recently, there have been more failures than successes. Major companies have disappeared, in particular Air Afrique, the first multinational airline on the continent, which could not resist the political interference and privileges granted to officials of its member states. South African Airways, the major operator in southern Africa, had to file for bankruptcy before painfully rebuilding itself. Tunisair is struggling to regain stability, as it has been managed by leaders appointed by political authorities without proven competence. Many operators simply disappeared, although some were later rebuilt, including Air Mali, Air Gabon, Air Senegal and Air Seychelles, to name but a few. It is a sobering picture, and yet…

However, African air transport is recovering, and not just marginally. A few leaders are driving this development. Foremost among them is Ethiopian Airlines. Founded in 1945 and initially built with the support of the American carrier TWA to international standards, it has consistently maintained its independence regardless of Ethiopia’s political changes, although it remains entirely state owned. Remarkably managed over the years by successive presidents, it has built a powerful operational platform based on a hub strategy. Today, it is the leading carrier on the continent, expanding not only through its own operations but also by developing a network of subsidiaries, of which the Togolese carrier Asky Airlines is a prominent example.

Others are also waking up, and quite strongly. This is the case for Royal Air Maroc. The airline was initially hit hard by fierce competition after the country signed an Open Skies agreement with Europe, which triggered a surge of European low cost carriers. In response, it created a hub between Europe and Africa in Casablanca and, after a difficult period of adaptation, this strategy is now proving successful. So much so that it has significantly strengthened its fleet, which now totals 67 aircraft, and is showing serious ambitions in the South Atlantic market.

For its part, Egyptair is renewing its fleet. The oldest African airline, founded in 1932, has placed orders for 33 new aircraft. It is still somewhat constrained in attracting certain European markets due to its ban on alcohol on board, but circumstances can evolve quickly. Even Kenya Airways, long underperforming, is in the process of recovery, having posted a profit of 42 million dollars, something that had not happened for years. Air Algérie is likewise engaged in renewing its fleet.

We are also seeing newcomers such as Rwandair emerge. This central African operator does not conceal its ambitions. After developing a medium haul network from its base in Kigali, it is now expanding its operations to Europe with high capacity aircraft.

Governments increasingly seem to understand what air transport can contribute to their economies. The liberalization of African skies is underway. It will take time, but progress appears inevitable. Infrastructure development remains essential. Ethiopia has committed to building a new world class airport, and Rwanda’s new airport is expected to be operational in 2028. Of course, many existing airports still require improvement, particularly Casablanca, which is approaching saturation, but the momentum is now clear. The growth of African air transport will be a major driver of the continent’s development.

The 5 billion passenger mark will have been passed in 2026. To reach this exceptional level, no fewer than 28,000 aircraft will be needed in service to serve just over 4,000 airports around the world. This volume of traffic is starting to cause serious problems. First of all, sufficient airspace is required, especially in very dense areas such as the United States and Europe. Secondly, it must be acknowledged that air transport is a source of CO2 emissions, even if it represents less than 3% of total emissions. Finally, we must take into account the attitude of populations living near major airports, who find it increasingly difficult to tolerate aircraft flying overhead, even if they are becoming quieter and quieter.

The outlook shows that the management of this activity will be complex over the next 20 years or so. Continued growth of around 4% to 5% per year is expected, which corresponds to carrying 250 million additional passengers each year and putting 1,400 new aircraft into service annually. The challenge is significant, as it is necessary to take into account not only aspects related to safety and security, but also the ever increasing demands of consumers who are less tolerant of delays, lost luggage, or lack of comfort, while at the same time demanding ever lower fares.

We are not far from a dead end. How can we ensure continued demand for air transport while respecting environmental constraints and consumer expectations? Governments will certainly continue to levy taxes, if only to satisfy environmental lobbies and fill their coffers, while imposing compensatory obligations on companies for operational hazards they must endure. How can this squaring of the circle be resolved? It will certainly be necessary to carry more passengers with fewer aircraft, at least through the use of larger, less congested airports.

A first response is provided by the entry into service of a new generation of aircraft derived from widely used models such as the Boeing 737 or the Airbus A320. These are long range versions with lower capacity than the aircraft used until now, which are only profitable when operated on very large routes, feeding major airports that are already difficult to manage given environmental pressures. This new generation, symbolised by the A321XLR with a capacity of 200 passengers and a range of 8,700 km, will be capable of operating profitably on medium demand routes that until now have been consolidated through major hubs, as well as on routes as significant as transatlantic or US coast to coast flights.

But this will not be enough to relieve congestion at major airports. One option is to create gigantic platforms such as Dubai World Central or Al Maktoum International, built to handle 250 million passengers, as well as the new airports in Beijing or Istanbul, which are slightly smaller but nevertheless larger than most older hubs, with capacities exceeding 120 million passengers. However, these large complexes will have to be built far from urban areas, if only to secure the necessary land, such as the 140 km2 required for Dubai World Central. By comparison, the surface area of Paris is 105 km2. It will therefore be necessary to create substantial new ground transport links, which will further impact the environment.

There is another solution, which would be to return very large aircraft such as the B747 or the A380 to service after their withdrawal following Covid. They alone are capable of carrying between 600 and 800 passengers, effectively replacing four aircraft with an average capacity of 200 seats. Of course, these aircraft had supposedly become too expensive to operate. However, in recent years the oil shortage predicted in the 2010s, when a barrel was priced at 125 dollars, has been replaced by relative abundance, with prices falling to around 67 dollars per barrel at recent quotations. As a result, most operators have returned their A380s to service. Not only Emirates, which has always believed in this type of aircraft and whose Sir Tim Clark has been calling for an improved version from Airbus, but also British Airways, Singapore Airlines, Qantas, Qatar Airways, Etihad Airways and even Lufthansa. Only Air France has not taken this step.

And then, to accommodate the additional 4 to 5 billion passengers expected between now and 2040, it will be necessary to design an aircraft capable of carrying between 800 and 1,000 passengers, not over very long distances but on flights of four to five hours, which are likely to multiply.

I hope that manufacturers already have such aircraft on their drawing boards and that the current major airports will be ready to accommodate them.

What better recognition of air travel than its success and steady growth since its revival at the end of the Second World War. It has reached 5 billion passengers, $1,000 billion in revenue, around 20,000 aircraft in service, and each new version is more efficient than the previous one, and the outlook is still optimistic despite the many obstacles along the way.

During his speech to the BAR (Board of Airline Representatives) of France, Willie Walsh, the Director General of IATA, pointed out the difficulties that this sector of activity has to face, difficulties that could be overcome with a little goodwill.

A very complex supply chain that is difficult to control.

Aircraft are becoming more and more complex and yet they must be more and more secure. And it is not easy. Indeed, to achieve excellence, you have to call on a multitude of partners, each one a specialist in his or her field. An aircraft manufacturer cannot afford to bring together all the skills in its workshops. He is an architect and a final assembler before delivery to operators. For example, the wings of the Airbus A220, whose program was taken over from the Canadian company Bombardier, were bought from the American company Spirit AeroSystems, which had them manufactured in Ireland. This does not mean that the device is unreliable, quite the contrary. Each of the subcontractors is an expert in its field. However, it may turn out that some defects pass through the controls, which are very numerous. This is what happened to a Boeing 737 operated by Alaska Airlines that lost a fuselage panel in flight. The defect in the assembly of the door was identified at Spirit AeroSystems, which supplied the fuselages to Boeing. However, no fewer than nine checks were carried out on this cell, both by the manufacturer and the operator. Thus, despite the best goodwill in the world and the assistance of the latest technology, a simple forgotten bolt can lead to serious consequences.

European air traffic control needs to be rebuilt.

This is Europe’s default. This small continent, if we consider only its surface, is also divided into about thirty states, each of which is master of its airspace and consequently of its control tools. However, it is enough for one of the control centers to fail for technical or social reasons to disrupt the entire European aeronautical operation. Willie Walsh estimates that the losses caused by flight delays due to air traffic control will be 16 billion euros in 2025. France and the repeated strikes of its air traffic controllers are being blamed. Of course, we could unify the management of the European skies, but each country is reluctant and each government is afraid of social conflicts. In other words, we know how to do it. The SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) program has been ready for years and we are doing nothing. However, the most serious estimates show that this would save 8 minutes of flight time on each trip. We expect the ecologists, who are so effective in their lobbying, to support this project with their governments.

Punitive taxation.

How else can we explain this avalanche of taxes that hit air transport. We can see populism showing up behind all these measures taken in general under the pretext of penalizing an activity that is a source of CO₂ production, by directing the large levies not to carry out research that could lead air transport toward zero carbon impact, but by drowning them in general budgets when it is not just to subsidize rail transport. And I am not talking about the delusions of which private flights are the target under the pretext that they are used by privileged people, when in reality the vast majority of them are used to develop economic activities.

An airport route to be rethought.

Willie Walsh did not mention this aspect in his speech, but let us recognize that it is a great source of frustration for passengers. Of course, safety is a major aspect of all public transport. But this concern should apply to all means of transport, including rail or road. This is not the case, and yet attacks have also hit rail transport without security checks being applied in stations, if only because we do not know how to do it. One thing is certain, however. The difficulty of getting to and through airports is one of the reasons for the transfer of a large number of air transport customers to trains, or even cars, for distances of less than 800 km.

Decarbonization requires the use of a new fuel, SAF (Sustainable Aviation Fuel), but this is difficult to produce and very expensive, probably because of its scarcity. This is another obstacle that air travel is facing, and I am not talking about cybersecurity, which will certainly become a major concern in the coming years.

Good luck!

The tug-of-war has begun between Ryanair and the European states. The latter, seeing the steady growth in air passenger flows, and thinking they were giving assurances to ecologists, have all taken the path of taxing airlines. In their eyes, this has a double effect: firstly, to slow down traffic volumes, in particular aircraft movements, which are sources of pollution targeted by some voters, and above all to bring money into the public coffers, which badly need it. Taxing passengers is well regarded electorally because they are still in the minority compared to other voters, so why deprive oneself of a source of income that does not seem about to dry up.

But things are not that simple. First of all, the new taxes that companies will have to pay will be fully passed on to consumers, and they are seriously starting to complain. And the transporters have a ready-made solution: since the states do not like them, they simply leave. This is exactly what low-cost airlines are doing. The latter have played an essential role in maintaining the economies of regions neglected by industrial development. Their economies have transformed from manufacturing to services and tourism. And the “low costs” have found themselves in a position of strength in these areas because they have the only model that allows them to bring in consumers to replace declining populations.

Basically, these new entrants play a real role in regional development. So they are beginning not only to threaten to withdraw, but also to take action. This is what is happening in the countries of southern Europe. This is not necessarily going to suit governments. Indeed, the volume of expected levies is likely to be much lower than expected, as the adage “Too much tax kills taxes” appears to be confirmed. In addition, this withdrawal risks leading to a considerable loss for the tourist regions that live off the contribution of these operators’ customers.

On the other hand, these same airlines, encouraged by continued growth and an efficient business model, have ordered a considerable number of new aircraft from the major manufacturers. The only five largest European “low-cost” operators, Ryanair, easyJet, Wizz Air, Vueling and Pegasus, have 1,354 aircraft and 983 on order. Opposite them, the three major groups, Lufthansa Group, Air France/KLM and IAG, certainly have 2,065 aircraft, but only 425 on order. However, all “low-cost” aircraft are short-to-medium-haul, while those of the major traditional operators are mainly used for long-haul flights. That is to say that the “low cost” carriers now hold power over European services, and this will probably be strengthened in the future.

Admittedly, geographically speaking, Europe is a small continent on which surface routes can become fierce competitors to air transport. High-speed rail lines have become very important, and the coaches of large private operators are crisscrossing the motorways and offering fares that even the most efficient “low-cost” operators cannot bear. Does this mean that European states will be able to do without their services if they decide to close ports of call, as they intend to do if governments do not reverse their taxation decisions? This is something that deserves reflection.

The balance of power between the public authorities and the airline operators is fairly even, and governments have no interest in seeing the very serious network of air services, patiently built up by the “low-cost” operators, shrink. The construction of a new motorway or a new high-speed railway is now facing fierce opposition from environmentalists, who will soon no longer have air transport to sink their teeth into. Admittedly, some air operators such as Ryanair have sometimes shown reprehensible behaviour, which is sanctioned by the courts in many countries. They will also have to improve both their social relations and their links with customers. They will have to comply with the compensation rules imposed by the European authorities. But for all that, states must not consider them enemies.

It is time for governments and operators to learn to talk to each other to provide the best service to the population.

Recently, IATA, the airlines’ organisation and owner of the BSP (Billing and Settlement Plan), has further hardened its position towards travel agents. The information reported by Déplacements Pros is important. It would seem that the tension between operators and distributors has been revived after the period of calm that followed the collapse of air transport during Covid.

It is worth recalling what the BSP is for and why it is essential in the organisation of air transport. Before the invention of this product in 1971 by Brian Barrow, then in charge of distribution at IATA, airlines had to deposit stocks of tickets in travel agencies, which classified them by carrier in standardized drawers. At the end of the month, depending on the agreements made between each company and each travel agent, the latter had to draw up a sales report and pay the amount to each carrier.

The invention of the BSP has revolutionized this practice, which would be impossible nowadays given the volume of banknotes issued. It consisted of using a single stock of tickets, managed by IATA, which receives payments from travel agents and distributes the sums among the operators. This is a huge administrative gain both for airlines, which no longer have to deposit their ticket stocks in travel agencies, and for the latter, who now make only one payment to IATA.

It took more than 20 years for this system to be extended to all countries, each of which uses its own administrative rules. It was necessary to create a BSP for each country or group of countries in the case of small markets. But little by little, this product has become a must for managing the relationship between travel agencies and carriers.

Apart from the United States, for which a similar body has been created, the ARC (Airlines Reporting Corporation), all the other countries, with the exception of those for which IATA considered it impossible to implement the BSP due to administrative and financial rules that are not compatible with international monetary exchanges, such as Algeria, Sudan or North Korea, now have the BSP.

However, the BSP belongs to IATA, i.e. the airlines, and the airlines are constantly repatriating the proceeds of sales held by travel agents as quickly as possible. For the latter, cash flow is an integral part of their economic system. The BSP’s payment methods, between 15 and 30 days after the end of the month of issue, allowed travel agents to have a welcome cash flow, even if it did not belong to them.

This advantage was all the more important as airlines gradually eliminated all commissions from their distributors. These commissions, between 7% and 9%, have been replaced by fees paid directly by customers. What we learn from the Voyages Pros article is that IATA will unify the rules for repatriating money throughout the world.

It goes without saying that this measure is the prelude to a real-time withdrawal of the money collected by travel agents, all electronically. This is the stumbling block. On the one hand, carriers want to collect their money as soon as possible, thinking that it is better in their accounts than with their distributors, and the latter will no longer have the flexibility to give even a few lines of credit to very large companies that pay at the end of the month.

If, as is very likely, IATA succeeds, how then will companies still be able to ask for bank guarantees from travel agents? It is not clear on what grounds they could be justified. Nor do we see why carriers should continue not to pay their distributors, whom they unquestionably need. It should be remembered that direct purchases by customers from airlines represent only 30% of the total, the rest being done via travel agents, including very large consolidators. The generalization of electronic operations has not changed anything.

A period of tension is beginning. The response of distributors will undoubtedly be complicated because they do not have a strike force of equivalent weight to that of the companies. But they will be justified in asking operators to join guarantee funds that will ensure the successful completion of the transport purchased by customers via their travel agents. So far, airlines have managed to postpone the implementation of such a guarantee, but pressure from distributors and customers on political authorities could well lead the latter to legislate on the matter. And we know that in this case they have a heavy hand.

Very interesting to follow Southwest Airlines’ earnings. It is the benchmark airline in the world of “low cost.” It was both the first to enter this field in 1971, with a huge expansion during the liberalization of the American skies in 1978, and it is also the largest in terms of turnover: $27.5 billion, even if the European Ryanair carries more passengers.

The fundamentals of the model are based on a few intangible principles: a single type of aircraft, faster turnarounds, densified aircraft capacity, no subcontracted distribution, very low call prices, a very stripped-down product with all services paid, all served by a young, enthusiastic, and sufficiently well-paid staff.

With this model, Southwest Airlines has been at the top of American domestic carriers with remarkable results. And then time did its work. Staff aged, became less efficient, and demanded and obtained benefits that were ultimately comparable to those of traditional carriers. The results paid the price. Not that the company lost money, but profits fell and, more seriously, the stock price began to decline with great regularity, which did not suit shareholders, especially investment funds. They demanded a change in management, and the latter adopted a very different strategy.

In fact, the new managers have evolved the pure “low cost” model toward a hybrid system. To begin with, distribution was extended to travel agents via GDSs; then the company entered into interline agreements, which had never been seen before. The product has improved and costs, as a result, have also increased. In total, the results were also badly affected, with a drop of 42%. And surprisingly, the stock price has soared more than 70% from its low, and the company is valued at 46 times expected earnings. Compared to Air France/KLM’s results, this would value the group at $16.3 billion instead of the current $3.63 billion, and let’s not even talk about Emirates Airlines, whose valuation on this basis would exceed $230 billion.

In other words, the stock market, which anticipates future results, has full confidence in the change in strategy of “low cost” carriers, whose product will gradually move closer to that of traditional airlines, which have gone the opposite way. Admittedly, after reaching the bottom just before Covid, the revenues of incumbent airlines are tending to rise. This was necessary because, even if their product was degraded, operational costs continued to increase, and customers no longer hesitated to leave for competitors who clearly displayed the simplest service.

It is therefore easy to imagine that the American example will be followed, albeit with some delay, by European and then Asian carriers. We are also starting to see the European leader Ryanair no longer hesitate to cancel services as soon as their profitability is no longer assured. EasyJet is taking the same path. This is how many small European airports will lose what kept them alive, as “low cost” operators have taken advantage of tax increases, decided somewhat lightly by government authorities, as a pretext to reduce their sails.

It is necessary to emphasize once again the lack of understanding in government policies which, in order to please a certain electoral clientele who will not be grateful to them, have consisted of taxing air transport in favor of railways, even going so far as to eliminate access to planes by administrative means, as we have seen in several European countries.

Meanwhile, orders for new aircraft, admittedly less polluting and more efficient, have multiplied. More than 16,000 aircraft are expected in the coming years, not counting new orders that continue to pour in.

Where are we going to put them if governments reduce access to major airports and if regional services can no longer be profitable because they are too heavily taxed? How will air transport, with its “low cost” components, be able to continue its beneficial role for the global economy and for bringing people closer together?

The next competition will no longer be in in-flight service, or even in fares, which we can expect will gradually be displayed more rationally than in the past, but will be played out in airports. The latter have become the main obstacle to air transport, which is poorly suited to the necessary fluidity of traffic, because if “low cost” carriers abandon small airports, there is no doubt they will strengthen their offer on the major platforms.

I ask myself this question every time I see a company buying another. It may be the rule of life but, to tell the truth, I don’t always see the point of it. Recently, the Turkish company Pegasus Airlines bought the Czech national carrier Czech Airlines after having acquired the country’s “low cost” airline in the past: Smart Wings. Of course, the Turkish carrier is doing well and its government is doing everything to develop its air transport, in notable contrast with the European authorities.

This is not the only example. Not only are we seeing large companies ready to devour smaller ones, but we are also seeing that good-sized operators are looking to be bought out by larger ones. ITA has been sold to Lufthansa, SAS is in the process of being absorbed by the Air France/KLM group and TAP is making eyes at the three European majors. What are the players looking for in this desire for rapprochement even if they don’t really need it?

ITA, the Italian company born from the disappearance of Alitalia, which, for once, could not hope to survive given the way it was managed for the sole benefit of its employees and friends of the government, has demonstrated its capacity for healthy and rapid development. We do not see why the Italian state did not simply let its national carrier continue its growth, which was virtuous and profitable. There is no doubt that the Lufthansa group has made a good deal.

The Portuguese government has launched a search for buyers for its company TAP Air Portugal. After a bit of a difficult few years, the Portuguese carrier has made a spectacular turnaround and is now in good health. Its size is respectable and it sits on a southern transatlantic network that is just waiting to grow. Why then want to sell what is profitable and bears the colors of the country? Because make no mistake, the buyer, whoever he is and whatever his promises, will only act for his own benefit, even if it means limiting the development of his new subsidiary.

The trend towards rapprochement, or consolidation, which means nothing, has never shown its virtues, neither for the companies it buys nor for the buyers, except in the case of a defensive strategy as is the case for Air France/KLM. In the United States, we have witnessed the demonstration of this phenomenon. The merger of most regional airlines, some of them of good size, into three major groups, United Airlines, American Airlines and Delta Air Lines, has not proved to be a success. It should be remembered that the three groups that finally won the competition all went through Chapter 11, i.e. the bankruptcy filing.

We must also remember the disastrous strategy of Etihad Airlines, whose bulimia almost proved fatal to the company. By wanting to grow too much, we end up creating disparate and ultimately ungovernable ensembles. Of course, I can always be opposed to the undeniable success of the IAG group, but for this to happen, the major carrier, British Airways, had to agree to leave the general management to a Spaniard, and it is difficult to see a German operator doing the same with an Italian, for example. And let’s add that the IAG group has a real international connotation where each component can be found, whereas this is not the case for the Lufthansa group.

And we can also ask another question: wouldn’t the companies of the same group achieve just as good or even better results if they were independent? One thing is certain, however, that countries that sell their national carrier lose in one way or another a formidable tool for the promotion of their country. This is what some states such as Qatar, the Emirates or Turkey have understood for example. Their national carrier and even for Turkey their “low costs”, largely supported by their government, have demonstrated their capacity for development. And the more their carrier develops, the more the country’s image carries estimable values.

Of course, some states are too small and too weak economically to support a company capable of carrying their image on an international level. This is what is happening in West Africa, or in certain Asian and South American areas. But there is always the possibility of creating and developing domestic and regional air transport for the best benefit of their populations.
An airline is valuable not only for its economic contribution, but also because it is a powerful cultural vehicle.