We may ask ourselves this question given the constraints imposed by the European Union but also directly by European states on their air transport. Long gone are the days when this activity was the pride of the continent. Between the 1960s and 1980s, European companies represented the jewel of the Old Continent, which was in the process of rebuilding itself after having spent centuries in internal struggles that almost destroyed it. It was the time when the national carriers: Air France, Lufthansa, British Airways, Alitalia, SAS, KLM and so on had developed the world’s leading international network, far ahead of even the United States, which was largely concentrated on its domestic space. Times have changed. Traditional operators have not been able to manage the arrival of “low-cost” carriers, which they saw as enemies instead of considering them as fantastic market developers. Let’s face it, airlines were the first to create their own difficulties.

But as they struggled with new low-cost competitors, government authorities, instead of helping them, continued to slow down their expansion. The first difficulty came in the contest of airspace management. The latter is fragmented by its geopolitical geography, each state being the owner of its aeronautical environment. While it has been possible to create a single currency whose benefits cannot be over celebrated, it has been impossible to create and manage a common civil airspace until now. The design of air routes no longer matches aircraft capabilities, and the loss of time is estimated at 8 minutes on average per flight, which is also an aggravating factor for fuel consumption and CO₂ emissions. In addition, the entire European area is penalised every time an air traffic control strike affects any of the states. One may wonder why governments and the European Commission have not managed to address this difficulty, even if it must be admitted that it is not easy.

Ecological pressure has also taken hold of governments, and they, through a curious demagogy, have placed the burden on air transport, which is accused of all evils, even though it is one of the few activities that has become aware of the importance of achieving carbon neutrality. Instead of supporting the necessary transition, the response of the political authorities has been to force operators to reduce their offer, without having consulted consumers for their opinion. This is why some airports such as Amsterdam or London Heathrow, or even Paris Orly and others that I am forgetting, have had to reduce or cap the number of aircraft movements even though their facilities allowed them to be expanded. We have also seen states outright ban air services when rail allows them to be replaced in 2 hours and 30 minutes.

At the same time, new and important traffic rights were allocated to Gulf carriers, such as Qatar Airways. I note that the Gulf Emirates have clearly perceived the political and economic importance of supporting the development of their airlines. We cannot blame them for that, but we would have liked the European authorities to do the same instead of penalising them. I also note that the latest European regulation on air passenger rights will impose new obligations on airlines, if it is adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

It is paradoxical, to say the least, to see that everyone agrees that air transport should achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, which, by the way, is impossible without a technological leap that we do not see taking shape, and at the same time, that we are clipping the wings of this activity. The investments required to decarbonise the air industry are prodigious, probably several trillion dollars, and we will have to find the resources to finance them. Where can this money come from if not from air transport itself—in other words, from passengers who will have to accept serious increases in fares that will produce increased profits for carriers, a large part of which will have to be devoted to research to achieve environmental targets. For this to happen, European air transport will need not only the neutrality of governments but their support, not financial, but administrative.

Without strong cooperation between all the players in the aviation sector and the states that hold the regulations and air traffic control, it will not be possible to make sufficient progress. Everyone must take their responsibilities, first and foremost the European Commission.

There is a great constant in air transport: everyone complains. Manufacturers are unable to deliver their orders due to a lack of manpower, carriers cannot earn enough money, with a few notable exceptions, airports are constrained by their pricing agreements with airlines and customers, and finally passengers themselves are not happy with the services provided by the entire chain of operators in this sector of activity. This does not prevent air transport from continuing to grow steadily since the end of the Second World War, i.e. more than 80 years.

In the middle of this activity are the airports. It is the obligatory and almost monopolistic crossing point if you want to get to a city by plane. Their position is sufficiently protected that they can afford to set their prices without fear of competition. However, the airlines are reluctant to pay the fares requested and have managed to ensure that these fares are governed by agreements between the users, which are the carriers and the owners of the infrastructure, the companies managing the airports. However, this practice puts the latter in a state of fragility. They are obliged to finance the development of their technical and commercial facilities for long periods of time, while operators can at any time change their strategy and, for example, abandon services deemed unprofitable, which takes essential revenue away from airports.

So to overcome the uncertainties and find the resources necessary for their development, management companies have resorted to two strategic developments. Firstly, for the largest ones, to broaden their field of activity by taking control of airport platforms that are sometimes very far from their historical base, and thus create a network capable of balancing revenues in the event of difficulties at one of the airports managed. And then to diversify their service offer within their facilities. Based on the principle that a clientele with high purchasing power was forced to spend long periods of time, sometimes several hours, in their terminals, the major airports have created shopping malls that are sometimes very large and attract major commercial brands and bring in a very significant income, up to half of the revenues of the major “hubs”, while providing a fun occupation for passengers.

Of course, the airlines have complained because they believe that the customers of these new shopping centres belong to them and that they are entitled to claim a share of the profit it brings. Airports, on the other hand, are fiercely opposed to giving up anything, arguing that without this resource they would have to drastically increase their fees, which is unacceptable to the airlines, and the latter claim that they are the only players in the air transport chain to lose money. This balance in the allocation of commercial revenues is unlikely to be upset.

On the other hand, large airports have to face a new risk: the development of surface lanes. The great progress made in rail transport and ecological pressure naturally lead to a reduction in the number of vehicles using airport car parks, which are so profitable, and even to a reduction in the number of passengers, and therefore of aircraft movements for services of less than 3 hours of flight. The safety constraints imposed on air passengers and not on rail transport customers are not for nothing. So imagination starts to run, and airports start thinking about new services.

Always based on the principle that customers spend a lot of time in their facilities, that they have an above-average purchasing power and that they are not afraid to travel, the managers of these large airports are embarking on the activity of travel agencies, as has recently been announced by Aéroports de Paris. This can become dangerous for the profession of tour operators unless this service is provided by an agency that buys a concession in the airport concerned. But it is difficult to see how, given the low margins made by travel agencies and the operational risks of tour operators, it will be possible to levy fees on this activity.

Once this new service is launched, it is difficult to see where it could stop: why not banks or real estate agencies, what do I know? Imagination knows no bounds… except perhaps those of common sense.

This seems to be a fundamental trend. The models that were once so different between traditional carriers and low-cost carriers are increasingly being copied. It took almost 40 years for the two models to gradually come together, and in the future only the distinction between short-haul and long-haul flights will remain. We go back to the origins of air transport.

Long gone are the days when historical companies saw the arrival, with some condescension, not to say disdain, of new entrants who claimed to make a place for themselves in a universe that was, after all, quite closed. To do this, they had the absolute weapon: the ability to put on the market fares so low that they were impossible to achieve by traditional carriers, all with the same aircraft. The difference in product was certainly real; there were, and still are, strong constraints: increased density of cabins, the need to buy tickets well in advance, the obligation to pay, in addition to the transport itself, for almost all the often-essential extras, for example the carriage of luggage or onboard services, even the smallest ones.

The vast majority of the companies already established despised these intruders and predicted an uncertain future for them, to say the least. Except that their analysis was wrong and that, for a flight time of less than 3 hours, customers began to favour price, which was often half that of the traditional carriers. The difference was even greater for business passengers, on whom the companies made their profits. The gradual loss of this prestigious clientele, who refused to pay up to three or four times the price on the same destinations, made even the largest companies think seriously. They gradually adopted the same practices as low-cost airlines, even if these practices did not cover their costs. They then tried to group together in essentially cosmetic alliances, without necessarily having great success.

The losses accumulated in competing with low-cost airlines led many air transport giants to file for bankruptcy. It should be remembered that the three largest American carriers – United Airlines, Delta Air Lines and American Airlines – have all gone through the American-style bankruptcy filing called Chapter 11. To regain decent financial health, the major carriers had to make considerable savings. These were painful, and the staff of these companies paid the price: up to a 30% reduction in workforce across all continents. In fact, the strategy of traditional airlines was to lower their level of service and even their product offering in order to almost entirely copy low-cost airlines, all while displaying fares identical to those of their new competitors.

Only the low-cost airlines themselves had to face the demands of their customers, who began to balk at the sometimes abusive practices of their carriers. They started to invent new services to compete with the incumbent operators. This is how they opened their sales to travel agents, which they had stubbornly refused to do. They then moved into major airports, whereas their strategy had been to serve only secondary airports for reasons of cost and speed of turnaround, allowing them to make an additional rotation per day. Finally, they began to establish interline agreements with the major carriers, despite having previously been their fiercest enemies.

In short, gradually, each taking a step towards the other, the two models have been converging, at least for flights of less than 3 hours. But for long-haul flights, the situation is different. Since the end of the Covid-19 pandemic, airlines have noticed that customers are accepting fares much higher than those they were used to charging, provided they find a product superior to what had become the norm. As a result, airlines embarked on a strategy of improving their services, particularly on long-haul routes, helped by manufacturers who brought to market much more efficient aircraft capable of operating non-stop flights of unprecedented duration. They created an intermediate class, often called Premium Economy, intended to accommodate customers tired of the increasingly basic service in Economy Class.

And whether they like it or not, low-cost carriers wishing to enter the long-haul market will be forced to provide a product that is compatible with their passengers’ expectations.

Thus, we can predict that in the near future, the distinction will no longer be made between low-cost carriers and traditional airlines, but simply between short-haul and long-haul flights, each trying to differentiate itself in order to attract customers.