The impact of the Gulf conflict on aviation is not simple, and the constant reversals of the actors make it impossible to make predictions about the end of the crisis. The complexity is all the more important for air transport as this conflict comes on top of the war between Russia and Ukraine, which has entered its fifth year. We never end. It is nevertheless curious that the belligerents have so much difficulty in sitting around a table to find an agreement since, in the end, they will be forced to do so. The consequences for airlines are not trivial.

First of all, there is the recurrent problem of fuel supply. A very good article in Air Journal sheds light on the European situation. 70% of the jet fuel consumed in Europe comes from the Middle East and, in particular, from the Al Zour complex in Kuwait. It is clear that this source of supply of Jet A or Jet A1 will be significantly reduced as long as the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened to navigation, and this may take several months after the end of hostilities, which is not for tomorrow. But the Persian Gulf is not the only potential supplier. The United States has come to the rescue and, while only 3% of European supplies came from this country before the conflict, the amount is now 40%. And it is possible to find new sources. However, it is quite possible that the price will remain at a very high level while transporters had become accustomed to a reasonable rate, around $65 per barrel, while it is around $100, and this may be for a long time. So the companies will have to redo their cost price calculations and therefore their public tariffs.

And here is another parameter. If, as one might think, prices will increase by around 10% to 15% to compensate for both fuel costs and longer flight times, especially between Europe and Asia, it is possible that this will slow down travel enthusiasm and that trips scheduled for leisure will simply be postponed, as air consumers are content with ground travel. On the other hand, we have the experience of coming out of Covid. The carriers did not hesitate to increase fares by around 30%, and in the end this was rather well accepted by customers, proof, if ever there was one, that the race for the lowest fares is and remains a stupidity that air transport will have to get rid of.

But there is something more diffuse, and that is fear. It is known that 50% of passengers have a more or less diffuse fear of planes. Some even have anxiety attacks, and it is not the obstacle course they have to endure in airports that will reassure them. So if we add to this form of anxiety the fear of being attacked by a drone or a lost missile, this can greatly influence consumer behavior. This is all the more pernicious because, even if the possibilities of hitting a civilian aircraft in the event of war are extremely rare, the examples are very real, between the Malaysian Airlines aircraft shot down over Ukraine by pro-Russian partisans, the Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 hit by a Russian air defense error again, or even when an Iranian Airbus A300 was hit by an American missile strike, but that was in 1988. In short, we must not play with the nerves of the soldiers in charge of anti-aircraft defense.

However, should air transport fear for its future, even in the short term? I am not convinced of that. Even if there could be a certain restriction of flights here and there, it would be surprising if it took on large proportions. On the other hand, carriers may be tempted to group together flights that are not well filled, especially when the services are very dense, such as the transatlantic axis. And let’s keep in mind that passengers for tourist reasons don’t just travel by plane; they have also bought their stays and booked their hotels and other tourist activities a long time ago to benefit from the lowest rates. They will have a hard time cancelling their holidays. It would therefore be surprising if air transport were to sink significantly. On the other hand, it is likely that the Middle Eastern destinations that were becoming very popular, I am thinking in particular of the Emirates, will be largely abandoned as long as the conflict lasts, even if the starting prices are such that they can compensate for the fear of going to these destinations. This could benefit certain Asian, African, and Caribbean countries.

However, let us rely on the imagination of hard-hit countries to find solutions. They have shown their resilience in the past.

We had gotten too used to it. Public pressure, unbridled competition between carriers, tremendous technological advances, the arrival of “low-costs” and the all-too-famous “yield management” have led to an almost constant decline in air fares, especially from the mid-1990s. And we had gotten used to it to such an extent that it was impossible to imagine the prices that passengers paid in the 1970s, which saw the appearance of mass transport with the arrival of very large aircraft. Well, those days are over, at least for a number of years.

Of course, manufacturers will continue their efforts to provide even more efficient devices, engine manufacturers are developing even more economical and less noisy machines, but all this comes at a price. Politicians in a hurry to give ecological guarantees to their voters are continuing their pressure on airlines by forcing them to become even quieter, and above all, to land at large airports without being detected. In other words, they are willing to use air transport on the condition that it does not harm the behaviour of the populations living near airports, and that the environmental lobbies have nothing to complain about, all the while demanding ever more competitive fares and even better services.

However, geopolitics is an essential component of air transport and sometimes, as is the case now, it creates a particularly delicate environment. The first effect of the current Gulf conflict has been a massive increase in the cost of oil and gas. While the price of a barrel had been stabilised at around $70 for at least a year, it has soared sharply since the beginning of the conflict in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, to quote $112.66 at the time of writing. And airlines felt obliged to put the famous fuel surcharges back into circulation. And they didn’t go down without a fight. I have in mind the case of a long-haul company whose starting price is around €750 and which has added a fuel surcharge of €550, i.e. 73% of the promotional rate on which it relies to attract consumers. It is not the only one, and most operators do the same, even if not in the same proportions.

And I wonder why carriers, who are perfectly capable of adjusting their rates by the minute, choose the fuel surcharge method to charge for an inevitable increase in their cost price. It would be more honest, let’s say the word, to display the new price directly rather than maintaining the promotional hooks. It’s still taking consumers for fools. This practice is all the more curious because most carriers scream before they hurt. The largest of them practice “hedging”, which consists of protecting themselves from hazards by buying their fuel well in advance. Air France/KLM has covered its oil needs for the first half of 2026 at 87%, and Lufthansa is doing the same at 76%. That is to say, these companies do not feel the increase in the price of a barrel of oil while they make their passengers bear it, while camouflaging this increase in a fuel surcharge, thinking that consumers will accept this approach.

We can clearly see the strategy of operators who are afraid to display the true selling price, which would cause them to lose valuable positions in price comparison sites that essentially display call rates. However, customers will still have a little trouble admitting that, from a displayed price that could suit them, they end up having to pay an amount much higher than the advertised price.

I understand very well that airlines, whose economic balance is very fragile and whose profits are less than 10% of their turnover, unlike many other sectors of activity which gravitate above 20%, are very sensitive to anything that could cause their cost price to vary. It should be remembered that the price of fuel normally represents around 20% of turnover with oil at 70 dollars per barrel, but that it can easily exceed 30% in the event of a sudden and lasting sharp increase.

It remains to be seen whether the current conflict will last, in which case the carriers will have been right to familiarise their customers with this increase. If not, let’s hope that the operators will fight to be the first to stop these fuel surcharges while explaining that the time of continuous price reductions is over, at least for a long time.